The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates: Simulation evidence

Public Choice

Volumn 103, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 337-355

  Cooper, Alexandra ^a   Munger, Michael C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034397491     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005150101110     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. Aldrich, J. (1980a). Before the convention: Strategies and choices in presidential nomination campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2. Aldrich, J. (1980b). A dynamic model of presidential nomination campaigns. American Political Science Review 74: 651-669.
3. Aldrich, J. and McGinnis, M. (1989). A model of party constraints on optimal candidate positions. Mathematical and Computer Modeling 12: 437-450.
4. Bartels, L.M. (1985). Expectations and preferences in presidential nominating campaigns. American Political Science Review 79: 804-815.
5. Bartels, L.M. (1988). Presidential primaries and the dynamics of public choice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
6. Black, D. (1958) The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Brady, H. (1993-94). Knowledge, strategy, and momentum in presidential primaries. Political Analysis 5: 1-38.
8. Brady, H. and Johnston, R. (1987). What's the primary message: Horse race or issue journalism? In G. Orren and N. Polsby (Eds.), Media and momentum, 127-186. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
9. Brams, S.J. (1978). The presidential election game. New Haven: Yale University Press.
10. Childs, R.S. (1975). Presidential primaries need overhaul. National Civic Review 64: 14-20.
11. Cook, R. (1994). Primary glut leads to hasty judgment. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 52: 142-143.
12. Cox, G. (1987). Electoral equilibrium under alternative voting institutions. American Journal of Political Science 31: 82-108.
13. Crain, M., Deaton, T. and Tollison, R. (1978). Macroeconomic determinants of the vote in presidential elections. Public Finance Quarterly 6: 427-438.
14. Denzau, A., Katz, A. and Slutsky, S. (1985). Multi-agent equilibria with market share and ranking objectives. Social Choice and Welfare 2: 37-50.
15. Denzau, A. and Munger, M. (1986). Legislators and interest groups: How unorganized interests get represented. American Political Science Review 80: 89-106.
16. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
17. Enelow, J. and Hinich, M. (1984). The spatial theory of voting: An introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press.
18. Epstein, L.D. (1978). Political science and presidential nominations. Political Science Quarterly 93: 177-195.
19. Felson, M. and Sudman, S. (1975). The accuracy of presidential preference primary polls. Public Opinion Quarterly 39: 232-236.
20. Ferguson, T. (1995). The investment theory of party competition and the logic of money-driven political systems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
21. Goldstein, J.H. (1978). The influence of money on the prenomination stage of the presidential selection process: The case of the 1976 Election. Presidential Studies Quarterly 8: 164-179.
22. Gopoian, J.D. (1982). Issue preferences and candidate choice in presidential primaries. American Journal of Political Science 26: 523-546.
23. Gurian, P.-H. (1990). The influence of nomination rules on the financial allocations of presidential candidates. Western Political Quarterly 43: 663-687.
24. Gurian, P.-H. (1993). Candidate behavior in presidential nomination campaigns: A dynamic model. The Journal of Politics 55: 115-139.
25. Joslyn, R.A. (1976). The impact of decision rules in multicandidate campaigns: The case of the 1972 democratic presidential nomination. Public Choice 25: 1-17.
26. Hinich, M. (1977). Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median-voter result is an artifact. Journal of Economic Theory 16: 208-219.
27. Hinich, M. and Munger, M. (1984). Ideology and the theory of political choice. New York: Cambridge University Press.
28. Hinich, M., Ordeshook, P. and Michelson, R. (1975). The electoral college vs. a direct vote: policy bias, indeterminate outcomes and reversals. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 4: 3-35.
29. Keech, W. and Matthews, D. (1976). The party's choice. Washington, DC: Brookings.
30. Kellett, J. and Mott, K. (1977). Presidential primaries: Measuring popular choice. Polity 9: 528-537.
31. Mayer, W.G. (1996). Forecasting presidential nominations. In W.G. Mayer (Ed.), In pursuit of the White House: How we choose our presidential nominees. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
32. Merrill, S. (1984). A comparison of efficiency of multicandidate electoral systems. American Journal of Political Science 47: 389-403.
33. Merrill, S. (1985). A statistical model for condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions. Public Choice 47: 389-403.
34. Moran, J. and Fenster, M. (1982). Voter turnout in presidential primaries: A diachronic analysis. American Politics Quarterly 10: 453-476.
35. Mueller, D. (1989). Public Choice II. New York: Cambridge University Press.
36. Norrander, B. and Smith, G.W. (1985). Type of contest, candidate strategy, and turnout in presidential primaries. American Politics Quarterly 13: 28-50.
37. Payne, J.G., Marlier, J. and Baukus, R.A. (1989). Polispots in the 1988 presidential primaries: separating the nominees from the rest of the guys. American Behavioral Scientist 32: 365-381.
38. Poole, K. and Rosenthal, H. (1984). U.S. presidential elections 1960-80: A spatial analysis. American Journal of Political Science 28: 357-384.
39. Poole, K. and Rosenthal, H. (1991). Patterns of congressional voting. American Journal of Political Science 35: 228-278.
40. Rabinowitz, G. and Macdonald, S. (1986). The power of the states in U.S. presidential elections. American Political Science Review 80: 66-87.
41. Rabinowitz, G. and Macdonald, S. (1989). A directional theory of voting. American Political Science Review 83: 93-121.
42. Schneider, W. (1995). So much for the conventional wisdom. National Journal 27: 1370-1371.
43. Smith, C.A. (1992). The Iowa caucuses and super tuesday primaries reconsidered: How untenable hypotheses enhance the campaign melodrama. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 22: 519-529.
44. Stone, W.J., Atkeson, L.R. and Rapoport, R.B. (1992). Turning on or turning off?. Mobilization and demobilization effects of participation in presidential nominating campaigns. American Journal of Political Science 36: 665-691.
45. Tullock, G. (1967). Towards a mathematics of politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.