Transaction cost estimation and international regimes: Of crystal balls and sheriff's posses

International Studies Review

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-20

  Lipson, Michael ^a  

^a Dept of Electrical and Computer Engineering   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FOREIGN POLICY; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; TRANSACTION COST;

EID: 3142667874     PISSN: 15219488     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1079-1760.2004.00370.x     Document Type: Article

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