COCOM is dead, long live COCOM: Persistence and change in multilateral security institutions

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 361-389

  Cupitt, Richard T ^a   Grillot, Suzette R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039325898     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123497000185     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1946), p. 51.
2. 'COCOM: An End and a Beginning', Defence Trade News, 5, No. 2 (1994), 4-5.
3. Karen Fossli, 'Accord near on COCOM successor', Financial Times, 8 November 1993 (can be found in the on-line service Lexis).
4. See 'Wassenaar Arrangement (a.k.a. 'New Forum') to take place of COCOM', Export Practitioner (January 1996), pp. 7-8; and 'US, allies agree to launch new post-COCOM export regime', BNA International Trade Daily, 20 December 1995, in Lexis.
5. See 'Wassenaar Arrangement (a.k.a. 'New Forum') to take place of COCOM', Export Practitioner (January 1996), pp. 7-8; and 'US, allies agree to launch new post-COCOM export regime', BNA International Trade Daily, 20 December 1995, in Lexis.
6. Peter Van Ham, 'Western Economic Statecraft in an Era of Communist Reform: How Can the West Help?' Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 21 (1990), 227-38.
7. Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Gary K. Bertsch and Steven J. Elliott-Gower, eds, Export Control Policies in Transition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992).
8. Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Gary K. Bertsch and Steven J. Elliott-Gower, eds, Export Control Policies in Transition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992).
9. The House Foreign Affairs International Trade Subcommittee, which is the primary subcommittee referral for the Export Administration Act, for example, held four hearings in the summer and fall of 1993 on the issue. In these hearings, US industries voiced their antagonism to current policy virtually unopposed, because the Clinton administration did not reach agreement on its position in time to testify. Not until the hearings before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee meetings in February 1994 did the administration present its views.
10. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 250.
11. Mastanduno, Economic Containment; Mastanduno, 'Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period', International Organization, 42 (1988), 121-50; and Hendrick Roodbeen, Trading the Jewel of Great Value: The Participation of The Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria in the Western Strategic Embargo Versus the Socialist Countries (Leiden: Rijksuniversiteit, 1992).
12. Mastanduno, Economic Containment; Mastanduno, 'Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period', International Organization, 42 (1988), 121-50; and Hendrick Roodbeen, Trading the Jewel of Great Value: The Participation of The Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria in the Western Strategic Embargo Versus the Socialist Countries (Leiden: Rijksuniversiteit, 1992).
13. Mastanduno, Economic Containment; Mastanduno, 'Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period', International Organization, 42 (1988), 121-50; and Hendrick Roodbeen, Trading the Jewel of Great Value: The Participation of The Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria in the Western Strategic Embargo Versus the Socialist Countries (Leiden: Rijksuniversiteit, 1992).
14. In November 1949 these states had established an informal Consultative Group (CG), but extensive co-ordination of export controls required close contact at the operational level.
15. See, for example, Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer, Balancing the National Interest: US National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987), pp. 135-7;
16. and Mastanduno, Economic Containment, passim.
17. Lisa Martin, Coercive Co-operation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), does use the number of countries that apply export controls as a measure of the extent of co-operation, but does not fully examine changes in the degree of co-operation over time.
18. Lewellyn D. Howell, 'A Comparative Study of the WEIS and COPDAB Data Sets', International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983), 149-59; and Jack E. Vincent, 'WEIS vs. COPDAB: Correspondence Problems', International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983), 161-8.
19. Lewellyn D. Howell, 'A Comparative Study of the WEIS and COPDAB Data Sets', International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983), 149-59; and Jack E. Vincent, 'WEIS vs. COPDAB: Correspondence Problems', International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983), 161-8.
20. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 161-2; Helen Milner, 'International Theories of Co-operation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', World Politics, 39 (1986), 466-96; and Joseph M. Greico, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 22-5.
21. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 161-2; Helen Milner, 'International Theories of Co-operation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', World Politics, 39 (1986), 466-96; and Joseph M. Greico, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 22-5.
22. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 161-2; Helen Milner, 'International Theories of Co-operation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', World Politics, 39 (1986), 466-96; and Joseph M. Greico, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 22-5.
23. Not all share this view. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, finds that participants in the GATT Non-Tariff Barrier code committees that met more often were those having the most trouble achieving co-operation.
24. Steven D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Steven D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 1-21, esp. at p. 3; and Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 15-19.
25. Steven D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Steven D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 1-21, esp. at p. 3; and Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 15-19.
26. Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 481-511; Keohane, After Hegemony; and Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
27. Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 481-511; Keohane, After Hegemony; and Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
28. Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 481-511; Keohane, After Hegemony; and Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
29. Beverly Crawford and Stephanie Lenway, 'Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-West Trade', World Politics, 37 (1985), 375-402. They argue that over time both compliance and problem-solving decision-making modes give way to compromise as the key decision-making mode in international institutions.
30. Crawford and Lenway, 'Decision Modes', pp. 381-2. We ignore problem-solving strategies because these largely involve an increase in the sharing of undistorted information, and may not be incompatible with most compromise strategies.
31. Werner J. Feld and Robert S. Jordan with Leon Hurwitz, International Organizations: A Comparative Approach, 2nd edn (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 125.
32. The data come from a variety of government documents, publications, some private communications and dozens of interviews with US and foreign officials who took part in COCOM and post-COCOM decisions. US officials include those in the Departments of Commerce, State, Energy, and Defense. Overseas, officials were situated primarily in the ministries of foreign affairs, international trade, and defence. The interviews were conducted by one author from July 1992 through February 1995, and in February 1996, and by the other author in May and June 1995. Generally, if the data is not corroborated by at least three sources, including at least two public sources, it is preceded by words such as 'alleged' or 'reported'.
33. Since 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States had vetoed any exception requests for shipments to the Soviet Union.
34. Communications activity, for example, can be portrayed both as a measure and an explanation of co-operation.
35. For a clear vision of realism, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), especially pp. 448-87 and 504-48 for a realist view of international co-operation. The seminal realist work by Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), discusses co-operation most thoroughly on pp. 41-60 and 63-88. For a more recent representation of the realist perspective, see Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations.
36. For a clear vision of realism, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), especially pp. 448-87 and 504-48 for a realist view of international co-operation. The seminal realist work by Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), discusses co-operation most thoroughly on pp. 41-60 and 63-88. For a more recent representation of the realist perspective, see Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations.
37. For a clear vision of realism, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), especially pp. 448-87 and 504-48 for a realist view of international co-operation. The seminal realist work by Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), discusses co-operation most thoroughly on pp. 41-60 and 63-88. For a more recent representation of the realist perspective, see Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations.
38. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
39. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, pp. 168, 236.
40. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, p. 44.
41. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, p. 46.
42. Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
43. Duncan Snidal, 'International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers', International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991), 387-403.
44. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
45. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', World Politics, 38 (1985), 226-54.
46. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, and Niou and Ordeshook, 'Realism and Neoliberalism'.
47. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, and Niou and Ordeshook, 'Realism and Neoliberalism'.
48. Robert Axelrod, 'An Evolutionary Approach to Norms', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 1095-111.
49. B. V. Yarbrough and R. M. Yarbrough, 'Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic "Hostages": Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade', International Studies Quarterly, 30 (1986), 7-21.
50. Milner, 'International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations', pp. 104-22; and Edward D. Mansfield, 'International Institutions and Economic Sanctions', World Politics, 47 (1995), 575-605.
51. Milner, 'International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations', pp. 104-22; and Edward D. Mansfield, 'International Institutions and Economic Sanctions', World Politics, 47 (1995), 575-605.
52. See Peter F. Cowhey, 'Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments'; Krasner, International Regimes; or Milner, 'Theories of International Cooperation'.
53. See Peter F. Cowhey, 'Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments'; Krasner, International Regimes; or Milner, 'Theories of International Cooperation'.
54. See Peter F. Cowhey, 'Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments'; Krasner, International Regimes; or Milner, 'Theories of International Cooperation'.
55. Steven Miller, 'Politics Over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Controls', in Charles W. Kegley Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds, The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 166-77.
56. Peter B. Evans, 'Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections', in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 403-30, at p. 403.
57. Evans, 'Building an Integrative Approach', pp. 405-8.
58. Mastanduno, Economic Containment.
59. Etel Solingen, 'The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint', International Security, 19 (1994), 126-69.
60. Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation.
61. See Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, 'Security Communities' (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1994), for an exhaustive review of the evolution of the concept of liberal security communities. Perhaps the most important recent work in this area is Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 1151-70, though the approach owes the greatest debt to the seminal piece by Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
62. See Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, 'Security Communities' (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1994), for an exhaustive review of the evolution of the concept of liberal security communities. Perhaps the most important recent work in this area is Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 1151-70, though the approach owes the greatest debt to the seminal piece by Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
63. See Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, 'Security Communities' (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1994), for an exhaustive review of the evolution of the concept of liberal security communities. Perhaps the most important recent work in this area is Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 1151-70, though the approach owes the greatest debt to the seminal piece by Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
64. For a classic work on social identity theory, see Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (New York: Routledge, 1988). For its application to international relations, see Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of State Politics', International Organization, 46 (1992), 391-425.
65. For a classic work on social identity theory, see Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (New York: Routledge, 1988). For its application to international relations, see Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of State Politics', International Organization, 46 (1992), 391-425.
66. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.
67. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', p. 1156. See Appendix 2 for a list of interstate wars, pp. 1165-6.
68. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', p. 1156. See Appendix 1 for a list of current liberal states, p. 1164. Doyle derives this list based on four institutions mentioned by Immanuel Kant: market economies with private ownership of property; externally sovereign governments; judicial rights for citizens; and representative governments. In addition, Doyle considers widespread suffrage as an important indicator of a liberal regime. See the note at bottom of p. 1164.
69. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 162.
70. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics'.
71. Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', International Organization, 48 (1994), 249-77. Also see Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'.
72. Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', International Organization, 48 (1994), 249-77. Also see Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'.
73. Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'.
74. Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 195-231.
75. Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'; and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 195-231.
76. Robyn M. Dawes, Alphons J. C. van de Kragt and John M. Orbell, 'Cooperation for the Benefit of Us - Not Me, or My Conscience', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 97-110.
77. See Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'; Lebow, 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism'; and Kim Edward Spezio, Beyond Containment: Reconstructing European Security (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
78. See Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'; Lebow, 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism'; and Kim Edward Spezio, Beyond Containment: Reconstructing European Security (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
79. See Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities'; Lebow, 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism'; and Kim Edward Spezio, Beyond Containment: Reconstructing European Security (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
80. See Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities', especially pp. 54-6.
81. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It', pp. 391-425.
82. Glenn Chafetz, 'The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 743-75.
83. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It'.
84. Interviews conducted by the authors with officials from the US Departments of Defense and State, the British Ministry of Defence, the Japanese Ministries of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Foreign Affairs, and the Australian Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.
85. Barbara Wanner, 'Clinton Administration Refocuses Asian Pacific Security Strategy', JEI Report, 11A, 24 March 1995, pp. 8-11.
86. Officials who expressed these views were situated primarily in the US Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy, as well as in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
87. 'COCOM Allies Struggle with Core List', Export Control News, 4, No. 11 (16 November 1990), p. 8.
88. 'German Fiber Optics Sale Enrages US Industry, Prompts COCOM Telecom Review', Export Control News, 5, No. 12 (18 December 1991), pp. 2-3.
89. Officials in the US Department of State, and in the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed these views. For a discussion of recent Japanese defence policy, see Barbara Wanner, 'Defence White Paper Emphasizes North Korean Security Threat', JEI Report, 26B, 14 July 1995, pp. 3-4.
90. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, Export Administration Annual Report Fiscal Year 1989 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 27.
91. US House Committee on Appropriations, 'Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1995', Part 1B, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, Washington, DC: Committee on Appropriations, p. 1229.
92. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, Export Administration Annual Report 1994 and the 1995 Report on Foreign Policy Export Controls (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 38.
93. Export Administration Annual Report 1994 and the 1995 Report on Foreign Policy Export Controls, p. 1252.
94. Even in the infamous Toshiba case in the 1980s, Reagan administration officials opposed the use of punitive sanctions as inimitable to promoting co-operation to prevent future violations. See 'COCOM Ministerial Meeting Planned', Export Control News, 1, No. 7 (30 November 1987), pp. 12-16.
95. 'German Fiber Optics Sale Enrages US Industry, Prompts COCOM Telecom Review', pp. 2-3.
96. 'COCOM Nears Final Agreement on Core List', Export Control News, 5, No. 4 (29 April 1991), pp. 4-5.
97. For examples of a few attempts to estimate costs, see William F. Finan, 'Appendix D: Estimate of Direct Economic Costs Associated with US National Security Controls', in the Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer, National Academy of Sciences, Balancing the National Interest, pp. 254-77; and J. David Richardson, Sizing Up US Export Disincentives (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993). For an assessment of security benefits, see Douglas E. McDaniel, United States Technology Export Control: An Assessment (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1993), pp. 97-134, or Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Relations, 1978).
98. For examples of a few attempts to estimate costs, see William F. Finan, 'Appendix D: Estimate of Direct Economic Costs Associated with US National Security Controls', in the Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer, National Academy of Sciences, Balancing the National Interest, pp. 254-77; and J. David Richardson, Sizing Up US Export Disincentives (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993). For an assessment of security benefits, see Douglas E. McDaniel, United States Technology Export Control: An Assessment (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1993), pp. 97-134, or Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Relations, 1978).
99. For examples of a few attempts to estimate costs, see William F. Finan, 'Appendix D: Estimate of Direct Economic Costs Associated with US National Security Controls', in the Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer, National Academy of Sciences, Balancing the National Interest, pp. 254-77; and J. David Richardson, Sizing Up US Export Disincentives (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993). For an assessment of security benefits, see Douglas E. McDaniel, United States Technology Export Control: An Assessment (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1993), pp. 97-134, or Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Relations, 1978).
100. For examples of a few attempts to estimate costs, see William F. Finan, 'Appendix D: Estimate of Direct Economic Costs Associated with US National Security Controls', in the Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer, National Academy of Sciences, Balancing the National Interest, pp. 254-77; and J. David Richardson, Sizing Up US Export Disincentives (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993). For an assessment of security benefits, see Douglas E. McDaniel, United States Technology Export Control: An Assessment (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1993), pp. 97-134, or Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Relations, 1978).
101. European Round Table of Industrialists, Export Regulations: European Industry and COCOM (Brussels: European Round Table of Industrialists, 1990); and 'Industry Groups Urge Repeal of "No-Exceptions" Policy', Export Control News, 3, No. 4 (30 April 1989), pp. 6-8.
102. European Round Table of Industrialists, Export Regulations: European Industry and COCOM (Brussels: European Round Table of Industrialists, 1990); and 'Industry Groups Urge Repeal of "No-Exceptions" Policy', Export Control News, 3, No. 4 (30 April 1989), pp. 6-8.
103. Security Export Control Committee, Industrial Structure Council, 'The Future of Security Export Controls', White Paper for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Tokyo: MITI, 1993).
104. 'Administration Announces Mammoth Control Reform', Export Control News, 7, No. 9 (30 September 1993), pp. 2-6.
105. 'COCOM Prepares for Busy September', Export Control News, 6, No. 8 (27 August 1992), p. 3.
106. 'Bush Administration Announces COCOM Position', Export Control News, 4, No. 3 (31 May 1990), pp. 2-4.
107. National Association of Manufacturers, 'NAM Export Control Survey', mimeo, July 1992.
108. Discussions with Japanese business officials, Tokyo, July 1994 and September 1995.
109. 'COCOM Continues Unfinished Work on Telecommunications Controls', Export Control News, 6, No. 4 (29 April 1992), pp. 7-8.
110. Officials from the US Departments of Defense and State, Australian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and Japanese MITI and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have expressed this view. In addition, officials from Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore and Ukraine have made similar statements about the importance of export controls and a liberal community.
111. 'Full text of the political declaration issued at the Munich Summit', Japan Times, 8 July 1992, p. 19.
112. 'Full text of the political declaration'.
113. For arguments that COCOM was ineffective, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968); or Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945-1965, Vol. 3 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1973). For arguments that COCOM was effective, see Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1978); or more recently Stephen Bryen, 'After COCOM, a danger of more Iraqs', International Herald Tribune, 5 March 1994. In addition to interviews by the authors of officials in the US Departments of Energy, Defense, and State, this is clear from the mission reports in Balancing the National Interest, pp. 183-220, and National Academy of Sciences, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 266-303. For more recent statements, see Frans Engering, the senior Dutch official who chaired the discussions on the end of COCOM, 'Export control goes national in post-Cold War era', Reuters Limited (11 April 1994); or 'Background briefing on export control by senior administration official', US Newswire, Inc., 29 September 1994, both in Lexis.
114. For arguments that COCOM was ineffective, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968); or Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945-1965, Vol. 3 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1973). For arguments that COCOM was effective, see Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1978); or more recently Stephen Bryen, 'After COCOM, a danger of more Iraqs', International Herald Tribune, 5 March 1994. In addition to interviews by the authors of officials in the US Departments of Energy, Defense, and State, this is clear from the mission reports in Balancing the National Interest, pp. 183-220, and National Academy of Sciences, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 266-303. For more recent statements, see Frans Engering, the senior Dutch official who chaired the discussions on the end of COCOM, 'Export control goes national in post-Cold War era', Reuters Limited (11 April 1994); or 'Background briefing on export control by senior administration official', US Newswire, Inc., 29 September 1994, both in Lexis.
115. For arguments that COCOM was ineffective, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968); or Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945-1965, Vol. 3 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1973). For arguments that COCOM was effective, see Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1978); or more recently Stephen Bryen, 'After COCOM, a danger of more Iraqs', International Herald Tribune, 5 March 1994. In addition to interviews by the authors of officials in the US Departments of Energy, Defense, and State, this is clear from the mission reports in Balancing the National Interest, pp. 183-220, and National Academy of Sciences, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 266-303. For more recent statements, see Frans Engering, the senior Dutch official who chaired the discussions on the end of COCOM, 'Export control goes national in post-Cold War era', Reuters Limited (11 April 1994); or 'Background briefing on export control by senior administration official', US Newswire, Inc., 29 September 1994, both in Lexis.
116. For arguments that COCOM was ineffective, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968); or Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945-1965, Vol. 3 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1973). For arguments that COCOM was effective, see Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1978); or more recently Stephen Bryen, 'After COCOM, a danger of more Iraqs', International Herald Tribune, 5 March 1994. In addition to interviews by the authors of officials in the US Departments of Energy, Defense, and State, this is clear from the mission reports in Balancing the National Interest, pp. 183-220, and National Academy of Sciences, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 266-303. For more recent statements, see Frans Engering, the senior Dutch official who chaired the discussions on the end of COCOM, 'Export control goes national in post-Cold War era', Reuters Limited (11 April 1994); or 'Background briefing on export control by senior administration official', US Newswire, Inc., 29 September 1994, both in Lexis.
117. For arguments that COCOM was ineffective, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968); or Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945-1965, Vol. 3 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1973). For arguments that COCOM was effective, see Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1978); or more recently Stephen Bryen, 'After COCOM, a danger of more Iraqs', International Herald Tribune, 5 March 1994. In addition to interviews by the authors of officials in the US Departments of Energy, Defense, and State, this is clear from the mission reports in Balancing the National Interest, pp. 183-220, and National Academy of Sciences, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 266-303. For more recent statements, see Frans Engering, the senior Dutch official who chaired the discussions on the end of COCOM, 'Export control goes national in post-Cold War era', Reuters Limited (11 April 1994); or 'Background briefing on export control by senior administration official', US Newswire, Inc., 29 September 1994, both in Lexis.
118. For arguments that COCOM was ineffective, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968); or Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945-1965, Vol. 3 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1973). For arguments that COCOM was effective, see Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1978); or more recently Stephen Bryen, 'After COCOM, a danger of more Iraqs', International Herald Tribune, 5 March 1994. In addition to interviews by the authors of officials in the US Departments of Energy, Defense, and State, this is clear from the mission reports in Balancing the National Interest, pp. 183-220, and National Academy of Sciences, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 266-303. For more recent statements, see Frans Engering, the senior Dutch official who chaired the discussions on the end of COCOM, 'Export control goes national in post-Cold War era', Reuters Limited (11 April 1994); or 'Background briefing on export control by senior administration official', US Newswire, Inc., 29 September 1994, both in Lexis.
119. For arguments that COCOM was ineffective, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968); or Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945-1965, Vol. 3 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1973). For arguments that COCOM was effective, see Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1978); or more recently Stephen Bryen, 'After COCOM, a danger of more Iraqs', International Herald Tribune, 5 March 1994. In addition to interviews by the authors of officials in the US Departments of Energy, Defense, and State, this is clear from the mission reports in Balancing the National Interest, pp. 183-220, and National Academy of Sciences, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 266-303. For more recent statements, see Frans Engering, the senior Dutch official who chaired the discussions on the end of COCOM, 'Export control goes national in post-Cold War era', Reuters Limited (11 April 1994); or 'Background briefing on export control by senior administration official', US Newswire, Inc., 29 September 1994, both in Lexis.
120. For arguments that COCOM was ineffective, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968); or Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945-1965, Vol. 3 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1973). For arguments that COCOM was effective, see Roger J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in Perspective (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1978); or more recently Stephen Bryen, 'After COCOM, a danger of more Iraqs', International Herald Tribune, 5 March 1994. In addition to interviews by the authors of officials in the US Departments of Energy, Defense, and State, this is clear from the mission reports in Balancing the National Interest, pp. 183-220, and National Academy of Sciences, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 266-303. For more recent statements, see Frans Engering, the senior Dutch official who chaired the discussions on the end of COCOM, 'Export control goes national in post-Cold War era', Reuters Limited (11 April 1994); or 'Background briefing on export control by senior administration official', US Newswire, Inc., 29 September 1994, both in Lexis.
121. 'Core List Round Two Negotiations', Export Control News, 4, No. 12(12 December 1990), p. 11.
122. 'COCOM Nears Final Agreement', p. 5.
123. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 239; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 508-28.
124. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 239; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 508-28.
125. See, for example, William J. Dixon, 'Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 14-32; or Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
126. See, for example, William J. Dixon, 'Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 14-32; or Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).