The rationality of rational choice theory

International Interactions

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 87-107

  Quackenbush, Stephen L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

Assumptions; Instrumental rationality; Philosophy of science; Preferences; Rational choice theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142615921     PISSN: 03050629     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03050620490462595     Document Type: Review

References (74)

1. Abelson, Robert P. (1996). "The Secret Existence of Expressive Behavior," in Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rationsal Choice Controversy: Economics Models of Politics Reconsidered, New Haven: Yale University Press.
2. Amadae, S. M. and Bruce Bueno de Mesquito (1999). "The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory." Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, pp. 269-295.
3. Aumann, Robert J. (1962). "Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom." Econometrica, Vol. 30, pp. 445-462
4. Austin-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks (1999). Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
5. Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books.
6. Axelrod, Robert and Robert 0. Keohane (1985). "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy." World Politics, Vol. 38, pp. 226-254.
7. Blaug, Mark (1992). The Methodology of Economics, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Brodbeck, May (1959). "Models Meaning and Theories," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., Symposium on Sociological Theory, New York: Harper and Row.
9. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1981). The War Trap, New Haven: Yale University Press.
10. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1985). "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View." International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, pp. 121-136.
11. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1996). "Beliefs about Power and the Risks of War: A Power Transition Game," in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
12. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman (1992). War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperitives, New Haven: Yale University Press.
13. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and James D. Morrow (1999). "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions." International Security. Vol. 24(Fall), pp. 56-73.
14. Cashman, Greg (1993). What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict, Lanham, MD: Lexington.
15. Coleman, James S. and Thomas J. Fararo, eds. (1992). Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
16. Cox, Gary W. (1999). "The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory: A Reply to Green and Shapiro." Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 11, pp. 147-169.
17. Danilovic, Vesna (1996). "Modeling Power Transition: An Extended Version," in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
18. Frieden, Jeffry A. (1999). "Actors and Preferences in International Relations," in David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
19. Friedman, Jeffrey, ed. (1996). The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered, New Haven: Yale University Press.
20. Friedman, Milton (1953). Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
21. Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro (1994). Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science, New Haven; Yale University Press.
22. Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization, Vol. 42, pp. 485-507.
23. Halpern, Jennifer J. and Robert N. Stern (1998). Debating Rationality: Nonrational Aspects of Organizational Decision Making, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
24. Hempel, Carl G. (1949). "The Foundation of General Laws in History," in Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
25. Hobbs, Milton (1993). The Objectives of Political Science, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
26. Inglehart, Ronald (1990). Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
27. Jones, Bryan D. (1999) "Bounded Rationality." Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, pp. 297-321.
28. Kadera, Kelly M. (2001). The Power-Conflict Story: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Rivalry, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
29. Kahn, Herman (1962). Thinking About the Unthinkable, New York: Horizon Press.
30. Kaufmann, Chaim D. (1994). "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making." International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, pp. 557-586.
31. Keohane, Robert O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
32. Kreps, David M. (1990). Game Theory and Economic Modelling, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
33. Lake, David A. and Robert Powell, eds. (1999). Strategic Choice and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
34. Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa (1957). Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, New York: Wiley.
35. Luebbert, Gregory M. (1991). Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe, New York: Oxford University Press.
36. Martin, Lisa L. (1999). "The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism." International Security, Vol. 24(Fall), pp. 74-83.
37. Morrow, James D. (1994). Game Theory for Political Scientists, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
38. Morton, Rebecca B. (1999). Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39. Most, Benjamin A. and Harvey Starr (1989). Inquiry, Logic and International Politics, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
40. Motyl, Alexander J. (1999). Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities, New York: Columbia University Press.
41. Niou, Emerson M.S., Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose (1989). The Balance of Power-Stability in International Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42. Niou, Emerson M. S. and Peter C. Ordeshook (1999). "Return of the Luddites." International Security, Vol. 24(Fall), pp. 84-96.
43. O'Neill, Barry (1992). "Game Theory Models of Peace and War," in Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart, eds. Handbooks of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. II, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
44. O'Neill, Barry (1999). Honor, Symbols, and War, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
45. Opp, Karl-Dieter (1999). "Contenting Conceptions of the Theory of Rational Action." Journal of' Theoretical Politics, Vol. 11, pp. 171-202.
46. Powell, Robert (1991). "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory." American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, pp. 1303-1320.
47. Powell, Robert (1999). "The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies." International Security, Vol. 24(Fall), pp. 97-106.
48. Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune (1982). The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, Malabar, FL: Krieger.
49. Rapoport, Anatol (1961). "Various Meanings of Theory '," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: Free Press.
50. Rapoport, Anatol (1964). Strategy and Conscience, New York: Harper & Row.
51. Rjker, William H. and Peter C. Ordeshook (1973). An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
52. Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale University Press.
53. Schrodt, Philip A. (1985). "Adaptive Precedent-Based Logic and Rational Choice: A Comparison of Two Approaches to the Modeling of International Behavior," in Urs Luterbacher and Michael Ward, eds., Dynamic Models of International Conflicts, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
54. Schuessler, Alexander A. (2000). A Logic of Expressive Choice, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
55. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast, eds. (1995). Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
56. Simon, Herbert A. (1976). "From Substantive to Procedural Rationality," in S. J. Latsis, ed., Method and Appraisal in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
57. Singer, J. David (1989). "System Structure, Decision Processes, and the Incidence of International War," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
58. Snidal, Duncan (1991). "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation." American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, pp. 701-726.
59. Van Dyke, Vernon (1960). Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
60. Vasquez, John A. (1997). "The Realist Pardigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal off Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition." American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, pp. 899-912.
61. Vasquez, John. (1999). The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
62. Verba, Sidney (1961). "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of the International System," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essay, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
63. von Neumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
64. Wagner, R. Harrison (1986). "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power." World Politics, Vol. 38, pp. 546-576.
65. Wagner, R. Harrison (1994). "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power." American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, pp. 593-607.
66. Walt, Stephen M. (1999a). "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." International Security, Vol. 23(Spring), pp. 5-48.
67. Walt, Stephen M. (1999b). "A Model Disagreement." International Security, Vol. 24(Fall), pp. 115-130.
68. Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1995). "Germany, Munich, and Appeasement," in Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
69. Yamamoto, Yoshinobu (1990). "Rationality or Chance: The Expansion and Control of War," in Charles S. Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky, eds., Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modern Era, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
70. Zagare, Frank C. (1990). "Rationality and Deterrence." World Politics, Vol. 42, pp. 238-260.
71. Zagare, Frank C. (1996a). "Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment." International Interactions, Vol. 21, pp. 365-387.
72. Zagare, Frank C. (1996b). "The Rites of Passage: Parity, Nuclear Deterrence, and Power Tranitions," in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
73. Zagare, Frank C. (1999). "All Mortis, No Rigor." International Security, Vol. 24(Fall), pp. 107-114.
74. Zagare, Frank C. and D. Marc Kilgour (2000). Perfect Deterrence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.