All Mortis, No Rigor

International Security

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 107-114

  Zagare, Frank C ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033472236     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228899560185     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. Stephen M. Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5-48. All subsequent citations are given by page numbers in the text.
2. See, for example, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
3. Specifically, Chalmers Johnson, "Preconception vs. Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 170-174.
4. Frank C. Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence," World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 2 (January 1990), pp. 238-260.
5. After noting what would constitute an "ideal" rational choice explanation, Elster also goes on to say that "scrutinizing mental states to ensure satisfaction of the causal conditions is then both impossible and pointless." See his "Introduction," in Jon Elster, ed., Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p. 16.
6. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), p. 164.
7. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
8. See, in particular, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "Asymmetric Deterrence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 1-27; Zagare and Kilgour, "Modeling 'Massive Retaliation,'" Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 61-86; Zagare and Kilgour, "Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of 'Flexible Response,'" World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1995), pp. 373-417; Zagare and Kilgour, "Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1998), pp. 59-87; Kilgour and Zagare, "Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence," Synthese, Vol. 100, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 379-412; and Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge Univerisity Press, forthcoming).
9. See, in particular, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "Asymmetric Deterrence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 1-27; Zagare and Kilgour, "Modeling 'Massive Retaliation,'" Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 61-86; Zagare and Kilgour, "Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of 'Flexible Response,'" World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1995), pp. 373-417; Zagare and Kilgour, "Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1998), pp. 59-87; Kilgour and Zagare, "Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence," Synthese, Vol. 100, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 379-412; and Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge Univerisity Press, forthcoming).
10. See, in particular, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "Asymmetric Deterrence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 1-27; Zagare and Kilgour, "Modeling 'Massive Retaliation,'" Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 61-86; Zagare and Kilgour, "Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of 'Flexible Response,'" World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1995), pp. 373-417; Zagare and Kilgour, "Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1998), pp. 59-87; Kilgour and Zagare, "Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence," Synthese, Vol. 100, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 379-412; and Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge Univerisity Press, forthcoming).
11. See, in particular, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "Asymmetric Deterrence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 1-27; Zagare and Kilgour, "Modeling 'Massive Retaliation,'" Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 61-86; Zagare and Kilgour, "Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of 'Flexible Response,'" World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1995), pp. 373-417; Zagare and Kilgour, "Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1998), pp. 59-87; Kilgour and Zagare, "Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence," Synthese, Vol. 100, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 379-412; and Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge Univerisity Press, forthcoming).
12. See, in particular, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "Asymmetric Deterrence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 1-27; Zagare and Kilgour, "Modeling 'Massive Retaliation,'" Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 61-86; Zagare and Kilgour, "Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of 'Flexible Response,'" World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1995), pp. 373-417; Zagare and Kilgour, "Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1998), pp. 59-87; Kilgour and Zagare, "Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence," Synthese, Vol. 100, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 379-412; and Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge Univerisity Press, forthcoming).
13. See, in particular, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "Asymmetric Deterrence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 1-27; Zagare and Kilgour, "Modeling 'Massive Retaliation,'" Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 61-86; Zagare and Kilgour, "Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of 'Flexible Response,'" World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1995), pp. 373-417; Zagare and Kilgour, "Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1998), pp. 59-87; Kilgour and Zagare, "Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence," Synthese, Vol. 100, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 379-412; and Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge Univerisity Press, forthcoming).
14. Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 934; and John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," ibid., pp. 899-912.
15. Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 934; and John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," ibid., pp. 899-912.
16. For a discussion, see Frank C. Zagare, "Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment," International Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1996), pp. 365-387; Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence," pp. 251-257;
17. For a discussion, see Frank C. Zagare, "Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment," International Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1996), pp. 365-387; Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence," pp. 251-257;
18. and Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence.
19. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); and Daniel Ellsberg, "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," lecture at the Lowell Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, March 10, 1959, reprinted in Oran R. Young, ed., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975). See also Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
20. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); and Daniel Ellsberg, "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," lecture at the Lowell Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, March 10, 1959, reprinted in Oran R. Young, ed., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975). See also Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
21. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); and Daniel Ellsberg, "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," lecture at the Lowell Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, March 10, 1959, reprinted in Oran R. Young, ed., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975). See also Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
22. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); and Daniel Ellsberg, "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," lecture at the Lowell Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, March 10, 1959, reprinted in Oran R. Young, ed., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975). See also Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
23. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); and Daniel Ellsberg, "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail," lecture at the Lowell Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, March 10, 1959, reprinted in Oran R. Young, ed., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975). See also Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
24. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 283-306.
25. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 283-306.
26. James D. Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 4 (November 1980), pp. 941-972.
27. See, for instance, Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
28. See, for example, Randolph M. Siverson's review of Walt's The Origins of Alliances in the American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 1044-1045. This may be an unfair criticism if Walt does not mean to imply that formal modelers should subject their work to large-N statistical tests. But then why does he ignore those studies that apply game theory to real-world situations? See, for example,
29. Frank C. Zagare, "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Vietnam Negotiations: Preferences and Strategies 1968-1973," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 4 (December 1977), pp. 663-684;
30. Zagare, "The Geneva Conference of 1954: A Case of Tacit Deception," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1979), pp. 390-411;
31. Zagare, "Nonmyopic Equilibria and the Middle East Crisis of 1967," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 139-162;
32. and Zagare, "A Game-Theoretical Evaluation of the Cease-Fire Alert Decision of 1973," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20, No. 1 (April 1983), pp. 73-86.