The power-conflict story: A dynamic model of interstate rivalry

The Power-Conflict Story: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Rivalry

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-190

  Kadera, Kelly M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

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EID: 85059264126     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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