A Model Disagreement

International Security

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 115-129

  Walt, Stephen M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0041540893     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228899560194     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Stephen M. Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5-48. Further references appear parenthetically in the text.
2. See Lisa L. Martin, "The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism," p. 82 n. 10; Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites," pp. 85-86; and Frank C. Zagare, "All Mortis, No Rigor," p. 108, all in International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999).
3. See Lisa L. Martin, "The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism," p. 82 n. 10; Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites," pp. 85-86; and Frank C. Zagare, "All Mortis, No Rigor," p. 108, all in International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999).
4. See Lisa L. Martin, "The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism," p. 82 n. 10; Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites," pp. 85-86; and Frank C. Zagare, "All Mortis, No Rigor," p. 108, all in International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999).
5. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," pp. 56-57, ibid.
6. Compare, for example, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 283-306; or Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 190, 205-206; and James D. Fearon, "War, Relative Power, and Private Information," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 31-April 4, 1992.
7. Compare, for example, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 283-306; or Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 190, 205-206; and James D. Fearon, "War, Relative Power, and Private Information," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 31-April 4, 1992.
8. Compare, for example, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 283-306; or Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 190, 205-206; and James D. Fearon, "War, Relative Power, and Private Information," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 31-April 4, 1992.
9. Compare, for example, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 283-306; or Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 190, 205-206; and James D. Fearon, "War, Relative Power, and Private Information," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 31-April 4, 1992.
10. Compare, for example, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 283-306; or Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), pp. 239-267; Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 190, 205-206; and James D. Fearon, "War, Relative Power, and Private Information," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 31-April 4, 1992.
11. Albert Einstein, quoted in Timothy Ferris, The Whole Shebang: A State of the Universe(s) Report (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 28.
12. This is true even of the most basic research tools. The calculus was a research tool of enormous value from the moment it was invented, but "a century and a half elapsed between the time the calculus was invented and the time [Augustin-Louis] Cauchy successfully gave it a logically acceptable form." See Judith V. Grabiner, The Origins of Cauchy's Rigorous Calculus (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), p. 16.
13. It should be noted that Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow and Martin acknowledge this point. See Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," p. 58; and Martin, "Contributions of Rational Choice," p. 76.
14. It should be noted that Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow and Martin acknowledge this point. See Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," p. 58; and Martin, "Contributions of Rational Choice," p. 76.
15. Niou and Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites," p. 87.
16. Robert Powell argues that nonformal theories suffer from a "lack of transparency" and an "inability to determine what follows from what," citing as evidence the fact that realists like John Mearsheimer and Charles Glaser disagree about certain aspects of international politics. See Powell, "The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 99-100. In fact, it is quite easy to identify why scholars in the realist tradition reach different conclusions; see Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477.
17. Robert Powell argues that nonformal theories suffer from a "lack of transparency" and an "inability to determine what follows from what," citing as evidence the fact that realists like John Mearsheimer and Charles Glaser disagree about certain aspects of international politics. See Powell, "The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 99-100. In fact, it is quite easy to identify why scholars in the realist tradition reach different conclusions; see Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477.
18. Martin points out that Thomas Schelling made somewhat inconsistent statements in two separate books, published six years apart. See Martin, "The Contributions of Rational Choice," p. 79.
19. See Niou and Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites," pp. 88, 89. Note the priority attached to logical consistency here as well.
20. Robert Powell, "Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age," American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 61-76.
21. James D. Morrow," "Allies and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 904-933.
22. Randall Calvert, "The Value of Biased Information," Journal of Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (May 1985), pp. 530-555.
23. Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," p. 62.
24. George cites George Ball's opposition to President Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policies as a case where a dissenter's advice was discounted because he "did not share the top policy makers' premise that Vietnam had become strategically important to the United States." See Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 3 (September 1972), p. 773.
25. James D. Morrow, "Electoral Incentives and Arms Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 243-265.
26. Ibid., pp. 261, 262, 265.
27. Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 1245-1256.
28. Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," p. 64 (emphasis added).
29. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.
30. Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow, "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 4 (November 1992), pp. 896-922.
31. Ibid., p. 907.
32. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320.
33. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320.
34. Martin, "The Contributions of Rational Choice," pp. 74, 76.
35. On this general point, see Donald N. McCloskey Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), chaps. 10, 13.
36. See Niou and Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites," p. 84.
37. See Zagare, "All Mortis, No Rigor," p. 112; and Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), especially chap. 2.
38. See Zagare, "All Mortis, No Rigor," p. 112; and Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), especially chap. 2.
39. See Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of Flexible Response," World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1995), pp. 400, 403-404, 406-407. In another article, Zagare and Kilgour discover that "the strategic position of a defender without a credible first-stage threat is not enviable," which was precisely the critique of massive retaliation offered by critics like William W. Kaufmann in the 1950s. They also find that "if credibility is considered to vary only across issues, the model suggests that confrontations are least likely as the issues becomes less salient to one side or the other." And when considering why nuclear war did not occur in the 1950s (when U.S. strategy was allegedly one of "massive retaliation"), they admit that "the model provides no obvious answer to this question." See
40. Zagare and Kilgour, "Modeling Massive Retaliation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 1993), pp. 78-79.
41. Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," p. 68.
42. See Curtis S. Signorino, "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 290, 292, 294 (emphasis added). A second paper cited by Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow concludes that "although the data suggest that Bueno de Mesquita's composite measures influence decision making during crises, the results are still weak." See Alastair Smith, "Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association," Boston, Massachusetts, September 3-6, 1998, p. 21.
43. See Curtis S. Signorino, "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 290, 292, 294 (emphasis added). A second paper cited by Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow concludes that "although the data suggest that Bueno de Mesquita's composite measures influence decision making during crises, the results are still weak." See Alastair Smith, "Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association," Boston, Massachusetts, September 3-6, 1998, p. 21.
44. Niou and Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites," pp. 93-94.
45. See Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Glenn Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 137.
46. See Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Glenn Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 137.
47. See Powell, "The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies," p. 104; and Niou and Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites," p. 90.
48. See Powell, "The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies," p. 104; and Niou and Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites," p. 90.
49. On Schelling, see Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On Waltz, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 21-22, 263-264.
50. On Schelling, see Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On Waltz, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 21-22, 263-264.
51. On Schelling, see Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). On Waltz, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 21-22, 263-264.
52. See Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," p. 71; and Zagare, "All Mortis, No Rigor," p. 114.
53. See Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," p. 71; and Zagare, "All Mortis, No Rigor," p. 114.
54. See Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); John D. Steinbruner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 223-242; and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
55. See Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); John D. Steinbruner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 223-242; and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
56. See Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); John D. Steinbruner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 223-242; and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
57. See Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," p. 70.
58. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The End of the Cold War: Predicting an Emergent Property," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 1998), pp. 131-155. Bueno de Mesquita performs 100 simulations using the model and discovers that the United States wins the Cold War in the majority of them. This result is not surprising, insofar as the United States began the Cold War with three times the gross national product of the Soviet Union and a superior geopolitical position. For a more prescient prediction, consider Kenneth N. Waltz's 1979 forecast that "with half of our GNP [gross national product], [the Soviet Union] nevertheless has to run hard to stay in the race. One may think that question is not whether a third or fourth country will enter the circle of great powers . . . but rather whether the Soviet Union can keep up." Similarly, my own analysis of the Cold War (published in 1987) argued that "the most important causes of security cooperation among states combine to favor [the United States]. . . . The principal causes of alliance formation work to its advantage and isolate the Soviet Union from virtually all of the world's strategically significant states." See Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 179-180; and Walt, Origins of Alliances, chap. 8, especially pp. 284-285.
59. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The End of the Cold War: Predicting an Emergent Property," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 1998), pp. 131-155. Bueno de Mesquita performs 100 simulations using the model and discovers that the United States wins the Cold War in the majority of them. This result is not surprising, insofar as the United States began the Cold War with three times the gross national product of the Soviet Union and a superior geopolitical position. For a more prescient prediction, consider Kenneth N. Waltz's 1979 forecast that "with half of our GNP [gross national product], [the Soviet Union] nevertheless has to run hard to stay in the race. One may think that question is not whether a third or fourth country will enter the circle of great powers . . . but rather whether the Soviet Union can keep up." Similarly, my own analysis of the Cold War (published in 1987) argued that "the most important causes of security cooperation among states combine to favor [the United States]. . . . The principal causes of alliance formation work to its advantage and isolate the Soviet Union from virtually all of the world's strategically significant states." See Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 179-180; and Walt, Origins of Alliances, chap. 8, especially pp. 284-285.
60. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The End of the Cold War: Predicting an Emergent Property," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 1998), pp. 131-155. Bueno de Mesquita performs 100 simulations using the model and discovers that the United States wins the Cold War in the majority of them. This result is not surprising, insofar as the United States began the Cold War with three times the gross national product of the Soviet Union and a superior geopolitical position. For a more prescient prediction, consider Kenneth N. Waltz's 1979 forecast that "with half of our GNP [gross national product], [the Soviet Union] nevertheless has to run hard to stay in the race. One may think that question is not whether a third or fourth country will enter the circle of great powers . . . but rather whether the Soviet Union can keep up." Similarly, my own analysis of the Cold War (published in 1987) argued that "the most important causes of security cooperation among states combine to favor [the United States]. . . . The principal causes of alliance formation work to its advantage and isolate the Soviet Union from virtually all of the world's strategically significant states." See Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 179-180; and Walt, Origins of Alliances, chap. 8, especially pp. 284-285.
61. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Multilateral Negotiations: A Spatial Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Dispute," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 317-340. Among other things, the model assumes that the Soviet Union is as powerful a player as the United States in 1990 and fails to anticipate the Soviet collapse in 1991. The model predicts that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would yield "nothing approaching even a semiautonomous state," and that "there appears to be no reason to anticipate more than modest concessions by the Israelis to the interests of the Palestinians in the near future." Ibid., pp. 337, 340. In fact, Israel did make important concessions during the peace process, and the Palestinians are very close to having their own state.
62. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Multilateral Negotiations: A Spatial Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Dispute," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 317-340. Among other things, the model assumes that the Soviet Union is as powerful a player as the United States in 1990 and fails to anticipate the Soviet collapse in 1991. The model predicts that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would yield "nothing approaching even a semiautonomous state," and that "there appears to be no reason to anticipate more than modest concessions by the Israelis to the interests of the Palestinians in the near future." Ibid., pp. 337, 340. In fact, Israel did make important concessions during the peace process, and the Palestinians are very close to having their own state.
63. For example, the authors claim that "the succession [to Deng Xiaoping] will be clouded by severe infighting" featuring "several rounds of brutal exchanges," and suggest that "the [Commu" nist] party will hold on to some power and perhaps nobody will win." The prediction is not very precise, but signs of severe infighting have been notably absent thus far. They also predict that "there is likely to be a sudden and dramatic collapse of support for market reforms" within a year or two of the Chinese takeover of Hong Kong, and forecast "that Hong Kong's autonomy will be eroded quickly, only to be restored for a period of a year or so." Neither development has occurred. They predict a dramatic decline in press freedom in Hong Kong (which has not transpired), and suggest that an important bellwether would be the suppression of demonstrations in Hong Kong commemorating the Tiananmen Square uprising on June 4, 1989. So far, demonstrations have been permitted. They correctly predict an economic slowdown in Hong Kong and in China itself, but this decline was the result of the East Asian financial crisis rather than the transition to communist rule. Nor has the value of the Hong Kong dollar declined significantly, despite the pressures created by the financial crisis. For their original forecasts, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka, Red Flag over Hong Kong? (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1996), pp. 8-9, 94, 97-98, 126-127, 129-130.
64. Personal correspondence with Joseph Nye, Richard Cooper, and Douglas McEachin.
65. Niou and Ordeshook, "Return of the Luddites, pp. 87, 93, 96.
66. Martin, "Contributions of Rational Choice," p. 78.