Can private learn from public governance?

Economic Journal

Volumn 115, Issue 507, 2005, Pages

  Frey, Bruno S ^a   Benz, Matthias ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GOVERNANCE APPROACH;

EID: 30744473745     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01041.x     Document Type: Article

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