Power of incentives in public organizations when employees are intrinsically motivated

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 161, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 664-

  Canton, Erik ^a  

^a CPB NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 30344477969     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245605775075942     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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