Stagflationary consequences of prudent monetary policy in a unionized economy

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 609-622

  Skott, Peter ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001398553     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028627     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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