Commitment rather than independence: An institutional design for reducing the inflationary bias of monetary policy

Kyklos

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 377-405

  Prast, Henriëtte M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008472926     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1996.tb01402.x     Document Type: Article

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