Democracy and the evolution of corporate governance

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 13, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 739-752

  Gomez, Pierre Yves ^a,b   Korine, Harry ^b,c  

^a EMLYON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (France)

^b French Corporate Governance Institute   (France)

^c LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Activism; Corporate governance; Democracy; Evolution; Political economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744608732     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00467.x     Document Type: Review

References (119)

1. Aguilera, R. V. and Jackson, G. (2003) The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, The Academy of Management Review, July.
2. Albert, M. (1993) Capitalism vs. Capitalism. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows.
3. Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. (1972) Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, 62, 777-795.
4. Alessi de, L. (1983) Property Rights, Transaction Costs and the X-efficiency, American Economic Review, 73, 64-81.
5. Arrow, K. J. (1951) Social Choice and Individual Value. New York: John Wiley.
6. Arrow, K. J. (1974) The Limits of Organization. New York: W.W. Norton.
7. Bartlett, C. and Ghoshal, S. (1989) Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
8. Becker, G. and Murphy, K. (2001) Social Economics: Market Behavior in a Social Environment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
9. Berghahn, V. (1985) Unternehmer und Politik in der Bundesrepublik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
10. Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan.
11. Blair, M. M. (1995) Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance of the Twenty-First Century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
12. Bourdieu, P. (1998 [1989]) State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
13. Bourguignon, F. and Levy-Leboyer, M. (1998) L'économie francaise au XIXème siècle. Paris: Economica.
14. Boyer, R. (1996) The convergence hypothesis revisited: Globalization but still the century of nations? In S. Berger and R. Dore (eds) National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
15. Brancato, C. (1996) Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: Best Practices for Increasing Corporate Value. New York: Irwin Professional Publishing.
16. Bratton, W. and McCahery, J. (2002) Comparative corporate governance and barriers to global cross-reference. In J. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboogal (eds) Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23-55.
17. Burnham, J. (1941) The Managerial Revolution. New York: John Day.
18. Cannellla, A. A. and Monroe, M. J. (1997) Contrasting Perspectives on Strategic Leaders: Toward a More Realistic View of Top Managers, Journal of Management, 23, 213-237.
19. Chandler, A. D. (1962) Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
20. Chandler, A. D. (1977) The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
21. Charkham, J. and Simpson, A. (1999) Fair Shares: The Future of Shareholder Power and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. Cheffins, B. (2002) Putting Britain on the Roe map: the emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom. In J. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboogal (eds) Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 147-172.
23. Coffee, J. C. (1999) The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, Northwestern University Law Review, 93, 641-720.
24. Coffee, J. C. (2001) The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: the Role of Law and State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, Yale Law Review, III, 1-82.
25. Condorcet, 1785, Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, Paris.
26. Dahl, R. (1956) A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
27. Dahl, R. (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
28. David, R. and Soref, M. (1981) Profit Constraints in Managerial Autonomy: Managerial Theory and the Unmaking of the Corporation President, American Sociology Review, 46, 1-18.
29. Davis, G. F. and Greve, H. R. (1997) Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s, American Journal of Sociology, 103, 1-37.
30. Davis, G. F. and Thompson, T. A. (1994) A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control, Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 141-173.
31. Del Guercio, D. and Hawkins, J. (1999) The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism, Journal of Financial Economics, II, 293.
32. Donaldson, T. and Preston, L. E. (1995) The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, The Academy of Management Review, 20, 65-91.
33. Drucker, P. (1976) The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America. New York: HarperCollins.
34. Ellerman, D. (1992) Property and Contract in Economics: The Case for Economic Democracy. Cambridge: Blackwell.
35. Engelen, E. (2002) Corporate Governance, Property and Democracy: A Conceptual Critique of Shareholder Ideology, Economy and Society, 31, 391-413.
36. Etzioni, A. (1990) The Moral Dimension. Toward a New Economics. New York: Free Press.
37. Etzioni, A. (2003) The Monochrome Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
38. Fama, E. F. (1980) Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.
39. Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983a) Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325.
40. Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983b) Agency Problems and Residual Claims, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 327-349.
41. Fligstein, N. (1990) The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
42. Florence, P. S. (1961) Ownership, Control and Success of Large Companies: an Analysis of English Industrial Structure and Policy 1936-1951. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
43. Foucault, M. (1980) Du Gouvernement des Vivants, Annuaire du Collège de France, 1979-1980, 449-452.
44. Freeman, E. (1986) Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. New York: HarperCollins.
45. Frentrop, P. (2003) A History of Corporate Governance. Amsterdam: Deminor.
46. Furubotn, E. and Pejovich, S. (eds) (1974) The Economics of Property Rights. Cambridge: Ballinger.
47. Galbraith, J. K. (1967) The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
48. Gastil, Raymond, D. (1986)) Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. New York: Freedom House.
49. Gilbert, L. D. (1956) Dividends and Democracy. Larchmont, NY: American Research Council.
50. Gillan, S. L. and Starks, L. T. (2000) Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholders Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, Journal of Financial Economics, 57, 275.
51. Goodstein, J. and Boeker, W. (1991) Turbulence at the Top: A New Perspective on Governance Structure Changes and Strategic Change, Academy of Management Journal, 34, 306-330.
52. Gomez, P.-Y. (2002) La République des Actionnaires. Paris: Syros.
53. Gomez, P.-Y. and Jones, B. (2000) Conventions: An Interpretation of Deep Structures in Organizations, Organization Science, 11, 696-708.
54. Greenberg, J. (1986) Determinants of Perceived Fairness of Performance Evaluations, Journal of Applied Psychology, 71, 340-342.
55. Guillén, M. F. (2000) Corporate Governance and Globalization: Is There Convergence Across Countries? Advances in International Comparative Management, 13, 175-204.
56. Hannah, L. (1976) The Rise of the Corporate Economy: The British Experience. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
57. Harsanyi, J. C. (1955) Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, Journal of Political Economy, 63, 309-321.
58. Harsanyi, J. C. (1975) Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls Theory, American Political Science Review, 69, 594-606.
59. Harsanyi, J. C. (1978) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
60. Harsanyi, J. C. (1982) Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour. In A. Sen and B. Williams (eds) Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 39-62.
61. Hayek, F. A. (1960) The corporation in a democratic society: in whose interest ought it and will it be run? In M. Anshen and G. L. Bach (eds) Management and Corporation. New York: McGraw-Hill, 97-117.
62. Hess, G. D. and Orphanides, A. (2001) War and Democracy, Journal of Political Economy, 109, 776-809.
63. Hirschman, A. O. (1970) Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
64. Holmstrom, B. and Tirole, J. (1989) The theory of the firm. In R. Schmalensee and R. Willig (eds) Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 61-133.
65. Huntington, S. (1991) The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK, and London: University of Oklahoma Press.
66. Jensen, M. (2001) Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. Working paper, Harvard University.
67. Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
68. Joly, H. (1996) Patrons Allemands. Paris: Presses de Sciences Politiques.
69. Kaeble, H. (1990) Sozialstruktur und Lebensweisen deutscher Unternehmer 1907-1927, Scripta Mercaturae, 24, 151.
70. Kaufman, A. and Zacharias, L. (1992) From Trust to Contract: The Legal Language of Managerial Ideology, 1920-1980, Business History Review, 66, 523-560.
71. Korine, H. and Gomez, P.-Y. (2002) The Leap to Globalization: Creating New Value from Business without Borders. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
72. La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999) Corporate Governance Around the World, Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517.
73. Leung, K. and Lind, E. A. (1986) Procedural Justice and Culture: Effects of Culture, Gender, and Investigator Status on Procedural Preferences, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 1134-1140.
74. Levy-Leboyer, M. (1985) Le patronat a-t-il échappé à la loi des trios générations?, Le Mouvement Social, 132, 3-7.
75. Licht, A. (2000) The Mother of all Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 26, 147.
76. Lind, E. A., Erickson, B. E., Friedland, N. and Dickenberger, M. (1978) Reactions to Procedural Models for Adjudicative Conflict Resolution: A Cross-National Study, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22, 318-341.
77. Lind, E. A. and Tyler, T. R. (1988) The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. New York: Plenum Press.
78. Mackie, G. (2003) Democracy Defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
79. Mandeville, B. (1723) The fable of the bees, or, Private vices, publick benefits. London: Edmund Parker.
80. March, J. G. (1978) Decision in organizations and theories of choice. In A. Van de Ven and W. Joyce (eds) Perspective on Organization Design and Behavior. New York: John Wiley, 205-244.
81. Marshall, T. M. (1987 [1949]) Citizenship and Social Class. New York: Pluto Press.
82. McGuire, J., Sundgren, A. and Schneeweis, T. (1988) Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance, Academy of Management Journal, 31, 854-872.
83. Mizruchi, M. (1983) Who Controls Whom? An Examination of the Relation Between Management and Boards of Directors in Large American Corporations, The Academy of Management Review, 8, 433.
84. Monks, R. (1998) The Emperor's Nightingale: Restoring the Integrity of the Corporation in the Age of Shareholder Activism. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
85. Monks, R. and Minow, N. (1995) Corporate Governance. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
86. North, D. C. (1973) The Rise of the Western World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
87. O'Sullivan, M. (2001) Contests for Corporate Control - Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the United States and Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
88. Pound, J. (1988) Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 237-265.
89. Pound, J. (1989) Shareholder Activism and Share Values: The Causes and Consequences of Counter Solicitations Against Management Antitakeover Proposals, Journal of Law and Economics, 32, 357-379.
90. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
91. Rippert, G. (1951) Aspects juridiques du capitalisme moderne, Presse Universitaire de France: Paris.
92. Roe, M. J. (1991) A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, Columbia Law Review, 91, 10-67.
93. Roe, M. J. (1994) Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
94. Roe, M. J. (2000) Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, Stanford Law Review, 53, 539.
95. Roe, M. J., Ramseyer, J. M. and Romano, R. (1993) Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, Yale Law Journal 102, 1927-1950.
96. Romano, R. (2002) Political foundations for separating ownership from corporate control. In J. McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneboogal (eds) Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 507-566.
97. Rueschmeyer, D., Stephens, E. H. and Stephens, J. D. (1993) Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
98. Schmitt, C. (1988 [1927]) Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
99. Schumpeter, J. (1987 [1942]) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: HarperPerennial.
100. Sen, A. (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day.
101. Sen, A. (1989) On Ethics and Economics. London: Blackwell.
102. Sen, A. (1997) Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
103. Sherman, H., Beldona, S. and Maheshkumar, J. P. (1998) Institutional Investor Heterogeneity: Implications for Strategic Decisions, Corporate Governance, 6, 166-173.
104. Smith, M. (1996) Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERs, Journal of Finance, 51, 227.
105. Soltan, K. E. (1987) The Causal Theory of Justice. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
106. Stahl, W. (1973) Der Elitekreislauf in der Unternehmenschaft. Frankfürt: Harri Deutsch.
107. Stanworth, P. and Giddens, A. (1974) An economic elite: a demographic profile of company chairmen. In Elites and Power in British Society, 81, 101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
108. Thibaut, J. and Walker, L. (1975) Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
109. Tocqueville, A. de (2000 [1830]) Democracy in America, edited by H. Mansfield and D. Winthrop, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
110. Turnbull, S. (1997) Corporate Governance: Its Scope, Concerns and Theories, Corporate Governance, 5, 180-205.
111. Turnbull, S. (2002) New Way to Govern: Organization and Society after Enron. London: NEF.
112. Tyler, T. (1990) Why People Obey the Law. New Haven: Yale University Press.
113. Useem, M. (1984) The Inner Circle: Large Corporations at the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
114. Veblen, T. (1921) The Engineers and the Price System. New York: Viking.
115. Wahal, S. (1996) Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31, 1-23.
116. Wartick, S. and Cochran, P. (1985) The Evolution of the Corporate Social Performance Model, The Academy of Management Review, 10, 758-769.
117. Weber, M. (1947 [1922]) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Tr. Henderson and Parsons.
118. Whitley, R. (1999) Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business World, Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517.
119. Yin, R. (1984) Case Study Research. Glendale, CA: Sage.