The work of John Nash in game theory

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 153-185

  Kuhn, Harold W ^a   Harsanyi, John C ^b   Selten, Reinhard ^c   Weibull, Jörgen W ^d,g   Van Damme, Eric ^e   Nash Jr , John F ^a   Hammerstein, Peter ^f  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^d STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^e TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^f MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR ORNITHOLOGY   (Germany)

^g STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347806375     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0042     Document Type: Conference Paper

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