The maximal generic number of pure Nash equilibria

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 408-410

  McLennan, Andrew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031065973     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2213     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Gul F., Pearce D., Stacchetti E. A bound on the proportion of pure strategy equilibria in generic games. Math. Oper. Res. 18:1993;548-552.
2. McKelvey R. D., McLennan A. The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria. J. Econom. Theory. 72:1997;411-425.
3. T. Quint, M. Shubik, 1994, On the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game, Department of Economics, Yale University.
4. W. Stanford, 1993, The Poisson distribution and probability ofk, Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago.
5. W. Stanford, 1994, The limit distribution of the number of pure equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games, Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago.