Correlated equilibria of games with many players

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 375-389

  Keiding, Hans ^a   Peleg, Bezalel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Correlated equilibrium; Large games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034311074     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820000047     Document Type: Article

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