The Design of Internal Control and Capital Structure

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 209-240

  Berkovitch, Elazar ^b   Israel, Ronen ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030560205     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/9.1.209     Document Type: Article

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