Exclusive contracts and protection of investments

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 603-633

  Segal, Ilya R ^a   Whinston, Michael D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034556589     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2696351     Document Type: Article

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