China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan

International Security

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 103-131

  Whiting, Allen S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035623319     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228801753191150     Document Type: Article

References (128)

1. Earlier studies of the Chinese use of force that draw on the historical record include Melvin Gurtov and Byong-moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); George Segal, Defending China (London: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840-1980 (Taiwan: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1993); and Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000).
2. Earlier studies of the Chinese use of force that draw on the historical record include Melvin Gurtov and Byong-moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); George Segal, Defending China (London: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840-1980 (Taiwan: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1993); and Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000).
3. Earlier studies of the Chinese use of force that draw on the historical record include Melvin Gurtov and Byong-moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); George Segal, Defending China (London: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840-1980 (Taiwan: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1993); and Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000).
4. Earlier studies of the Chinese use of force that draw on the historical record include Melvin Gurtov and Byong-moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); George Segal, Defending China (London: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840-1980 (Taiwan: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1993); and Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000).
5. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Vietnam (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).
6. Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40, calls attention to Chinese strategic writings concerning Taiwan and the question of U.S. intervention.
7. Motivations may be multiple with behavior also targeting third parties, foreign or domestic. Inferring motivation is impeded by regime statements aimed at dissuading critics, rationalizing risks, and claiming victory after stalemate or defeat. These aspects are discussed in the case studies but remain subject to academic dispute until more Chinese archives are available. Coercive diplomacy is defined as taking action to "persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action." Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 7.
8. The classic analysis of the role of uncertainty and chance in war is Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1976), especially Bk. 1, chap. 7, "Friction in War," p. 120, where he notes, "Every war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an uncharted sea, full of reefs."
9. The classic analysis of the role of uncertainty and chance in war is Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1976), especially Bk. 1, chap. 7, "Friction in War," p. 120, where he notes, "Every war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an uncharted sea, full of reefs."
10. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). The classics appeared between the fifth century B.C. and the tenth century A.D. Johnston then traced this parabellum, or hard realpolitik paradigm, through military memorials submitted during the Ming dynasty of the fifteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries.
11. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 216-270.
12. Paul H.D.B. Godwin, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine- 1949-1999," Conference on PLA Warfighting, 1949-1999, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia, June 3-4, 1999. The citation is from Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," December 1936, in Selected Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), p. 105. I am indebted to Godwin for the manuscript and informal exchanges.
13. Paul H.D.B. Godwin, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine- 1949-1999," Conference on PLA Warfighting, 1949-1999, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia, June 3-4, 1999. The citation is from Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," December 1936, in Selected Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), p. 105. I am indebted to Godwin for the manuscript and informal exchanges.
14. Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 1-35.
15. Chen Yi, interview of May 29, 1962, Tokyo Journalist, June 26, 1962, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), August 13, 1962.
16. For detailed reconstruction, see Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960).
17. Mao's decision came incrementally, with intermittent reversals, but was finally triggered by the UN forces' crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel. See Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 157. This is the most comprehensive analysis on the basis of Chinese and Russian archives at the time of writing.
18. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 68-115.
19. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 171-186.
20. Zhang Xiaoming, "Air Combat for the People's Republic: The People's Liberation Army Air Force in Action, 1949-1969," Conference on PLA Warfighting, 1949-1999, citing Li Chuangeng, Feijiangjun Liu Benshan [Biography of General Liu Benshan] (Beijing: CCP [Chinese Communist Party] History Press, 1995), pp. 344-345.
21. Zhang Xiaoming, "Air Combat for the People's Republic: The People's Liberation Army Air Force in Action, 1949-1969," Conference on PLA Warfighting, 1949-1999, citing Li Chuangeng, Feijiangjun Liu Benshan [Biography of General Liu Benshan] (Beijing: CCP [Chinese Communist Party] History Press, 1995), pp. 344-345.
22. Mao Zedong at enlarged meeting of the CCP Politburo, July 7, 1954, in Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, "Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Probe in Confrontation: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks As Seen from the Chinese Perspective," in Robert S. Ross, ed., Reexamining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).
23. Mao Zedong at enlarged meeting of the CCP Politburo, July 7, 1954, in Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, "Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Probe in Confrontation: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks As Seen from the Chinese Perspective," in Robert S. Ross, ed., Reexamining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).
24. PLA archives at the PLA Academy of Military Science, in Li Xiaoping, "PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations during the Taiwan Straits Crises of 1954-1955 and 1958," Conference on PLA Warfighting, 1949-1999.
25. Zhang and Jia, "Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Probe in Confrontation"; interviews with Gen. Ye Fei (Ret.); also Ye Fei, Ye Fei huiyilu [Memoirs of Ye Fei] (Beijing: PLA Press, 1988), p. 644.
26. Zhang and Jia, "Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Probe in Confrontation"; interviews with Gen. Ye Fei (Ret.); also Ye Fei, Ye Fei huiyilu [Memoirs of Ye Fei] (Beijing: PLA Press, 1988), p. 644.
27. Zhang and Jia, "Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Probe in Confrontation," citing Deng Lifeng, Jianguo hou junshi xingdong quanji [A whole record of military operations after the founding of the republic] (Taiyuan: Shanxi People's Press, 1994), p. 207.
28. Zhang and Jia, "Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Probe in Confrontation," citing Nie Fangzhi, Sanjun huige zhan dongha: [Eagles soar to the sky and shock the East China Sea].
29. Zhang and Jia, "Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Probe in Confrontation," citing Dongdai Zhongguo kongjun [China today: Air force] (Beijing: Social Sciences Press, 1989), p. 355.
30. Christensen, Useful Adversaries, details evidence for Mao's multiple motivations.
31. Mao "to Peng Dehuai," in Li, "PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations," from Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [The manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the founding of the nation] (Beiiing: Central Documents Publishing Company, 1987-90), Vol. 7, p. 326.
32. Mao "to Peng Dehuai," in Li, "PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations," from Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [The manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the founding of the nation] (Beiiing: Central Documents Publishing Company, 1987-90), Vol. 7, p. 326.
33. Information given to the author; U.S. ships ignored this announcement and continued to escort Nationalist ships within 3 miles of the islands. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the Twenty-first Century (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), based on Dongdai Zhongguo kongjun, pp. 396-397, 651-677.
34. Information given to the author; U.S. ships ignored this announcement and continued to escort Nationalist ships within 3 miles of the islands. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the Twenty-first Century (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), based on Dongdai Zhongguo kongjun, pp. 396-397, 651-677.
35. Li, "PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations," citing The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong, Vol. 7, p. 348.
36. Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1994), in James G. Hershberg, ed., Cold War International History Project Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center), Nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995-96), p. 217.
37. Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1994), in James G. Hershberg, ed., Cold War International History Project Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center), Nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995-96), p. 217.
38. Li, "PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations," gives no source for this account.
39. Ibid., citing Wu Lengxi, "Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen," Zhuanji wenxue [Biographical literature], No. 1 (1994), p. 11.
40. Ibid., citing Wu Lengxi, "Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen," Zhuanji wenxue [Biographical literature], No. 1 (1994), p. 11.
41. People's Daily, May 19, 1962, in Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 66.
42. People's Daily, May 19, 1962, in Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 66.
43. Press conference, May 29, 1961, in ibid., p. 67.
44. Special National Intelligence Estimate, June 20, 1962, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1962-1963, Northeast Asia, Vol. 22, pp. 251-253. This may have overstated the actual number of troops with signal intelligence monitoring headquarters deployment in advance of the total force.
45. U.S. embassy, Warsaw, telegram to Department of State, June 23, 1962, in ibid., pp. 273-275. This version omits all reference to Korea, unlike the original cable sent immediately to the State Department and seen by the author on arrival. The previous meeting, on May 17, 1962, had scheduled the next one for July 12. Ibid., pp. 225-226.
46. U.S. embassy, Warsaw, telegram to Department of State, June 23, 1962, in ibid., pp. 273-275. This version omits all reference to Korea, unlike the original cable sent immediately to the State Department and seen by the author on arrival. The previous meeting, on May 17, 1962, had scheduled the next one for July 12. Ibid., pp. 225-226.
47. Peking Review, June 29, 1962, in Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 68.
48. Peking Review, June 29, 1962, in Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 68.
49. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Chiang ordered a complete overhaul of his invasion plans and covertly sought purchase of 500 large outboard motors in the United States; the purchase was blocked. Information given the author.
50. This section draws on Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence.
51. Ibid., p. 94.
52. Ibid., p. 95.
53. Information available to the author.
54. Statement by Vietnamese military historian to the author at a Vietnamese-American conference on the war, Hanoi, October 18-20, 1988; also Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 135.
55. Quoted in Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1965: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, Vol. 60 (October 1996), pp. 731-762, citing Wang Xiangen, Zhongguo mimi da Fabing: yuan Ye kang Mei shilu [China's secret military deployment: Record of aiding Vietnam and resisting America] (Jinan: Jinan Press, 1992), p. 161.
56. Quoted in Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1965: A Chinese Perspective," Journal of Military History, Vol. 60 (October 1996), pp. 731-762, citing Wang Xiangen, Zhongguo mimi da Fabing: yuan Ye kang Mei shilu [China's secret military deployment: Record of aiding Vietnam and resisting America] (Jinan: Jinan Press, 1992), p. 161.
57. Peking Review, August 13, 1965, in Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 164.
58. Peking Review, August 13, 1965, in Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, p. 164.
59. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 135, citing Guo Ming, ed., Zhong Youe guanxi yanbian sishinian [The evolution of Sino-Vietnamese relations over the last forty years] (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chuban shi, 1991). Beijing has acknowledged that 1,000 Chinese troops remain buried in Vietnam.
60. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 135, citing Guo Ming, ed., Zhong Youe guanxi yanbian sishinian [The evolution of Sino-Vietnamese relations over the last forty years] (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chuban shi, 1991). Beijing has acknowledged that 1,000 Chinese troops remain buried in Vietnam.
61. During 1965-66, an invasion of North Vietnam by three divisions at the port of Vinh to link up with a force entering from Thailand to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail was intensively debated within the administration. The author participated concerning the disposition of Chinese forces in North Vietnam, which appeared to commit Beijing to whatever role was necessary for Hanoi.
62. Zhang, "The Vietnam War," citing Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua degeming zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The People's Liberation Army during the Cultural Revolution] (Beijing: CCP Historical Materials Press, 1989), p. 341; and Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, cites the "Six-Point Directive on the Struggle against U.S. Ships and Aircraft in the South China Sea," New China News Agency, January 11, 1965.
63. Zhang, "The Vietnam War," citing Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua degeming zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The People's Liberation Army during the Cultural Revolution] (Beijing: CCP Historical Materials Press, 1989), p. 341; and Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, cites the "Six-Point Directive on the Struggle against U.S. Ships and Aircraft in the South China Sea," New China News Agency, January 11, 1965.
64. U.S. military sources did not acknowledge the Chinese claim.
65. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, citing Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Mao Zedong's military papers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993), Vol. 6, p. 403.
66. Ibid., p. 143, citing Lin Hu, ed., Kunjun shi [History of the air force] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989).
67. Ibid., p. 143, citing Lin Hu, ed., Kunjun shi [History of the air force] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989).
68. Ibid., citing Dongdai Zhongguo kongjun, pp. 390-392.
69. Information available to the author.
70. Moscow and Ulan Bator had previously concluded a military pact against the Japanese threat from Manchuria in 1936; Elena Boikova, "Aspects of Soviet-Mongolian Relations, 1929-1939," in Stephin Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman, eds., Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 107-122.
71. Mao Zedong, speech to Japanese visitors, July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong sixiang wan sui [Long live Mao Zedong thought] (Taipei: n.p., 1974), pp. 540-541; a similar version is in Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1965), p. 44.
72. Mao Zedong, speech to Japanese visitors, July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong sixiang wan sui [Long live Mao Zedong thought] (Taipei: n.p., 1974), pp. 540-541; a similar version is in Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1965), p. 44.
73. Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 276-279, offers a secret Soviet account of the clashes in the East German archives. Allegations of vicious mutilation of Soviet corpses may have been exaggerated for East German consumption.
74. Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution (London: Kegan Paul International, 1998), p. 88, citing Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun.
75. Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution (London: Kegan Paul International, 1998), p. 88, citing Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun.
76. Gong Li, "Chinese Decision-Making and Thaw of U.S. Relations," in Ross, Reexamining the Cold War, citing Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, pp. 318-319.
77. Gong Li, "Chinese Decision-Making and Thaw of U.S. Relations," in Ross, Reexamining the Cold War, citing Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, pp. 318-319.
78. Gong Li, "Chinese Decision-Making and Thaw of U.S. Relations," in Ross, Reexamining the Cold War, citing Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, pp. 318-319.
79. Ibid., p. 320.
80. Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution, p. 88.
81. Quoted in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu [A factual history of the People's Republic of China] (Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1994), Vol. 3, Pt. 1, p. 469, in James G. Hershberg, ed., Cold Weir International History Project Bulletin, No. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 162.
82. Quoted in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu [A factual history of the People's Republic of China] (Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1994), Vol. 3, Pt. 1, p. 469, in James G. Hershberg, ed., Cold Weir International History Project Bulletin, No. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 162.
83. In June 1969 a bomber wing moved from Eastern Europe to a Central Asian base from which it exercised attacks on targets in northwest China, including the nuclear facility at Lanzhou. That summer Soviet diplomats hinted to East European and U.S. officials of a possible strike against this production point; information available to the author. On September 17 Chen Yi reported to Mao, "Quite recently they have . . . voiced nuclear threats against us and plotted a sudden strike on our nuclear installations." Quoted in Barnouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution, p. 143.
84. This section is informed by a U.S. military specialist on the conflict.
85. Hank Kenney, "Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China," Center for Naval Analysis draft April 28 1999, p. 1; see also Harlan W. Jenks, "China's 'Punitive War' on Vietnam," Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 8 (August 1979), pp. 801-805.
86. Hank Kenney, "Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China," Center for Naval Analysis draft April 28 1999, p. 1; see also Harlan W. Jenks, "China's 'Punitive War' on Vietnam," Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 8 (August 1979), pp. 801-805.
87. On Vietnam's Expulsion of Chinese Residents (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1978). pp. 71-72.
88. Kenny, "Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China," p. 10.
89. Robert G. Sutler, Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments after Mao (New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 79-80.
90. Kenneth W. Allen, People's Republic of China's Liberation Army Air Force (Washington D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1991), depicts the shipment of 10,000 mobile beds, 32,000 meters of water pipe, 43,000 square meters of bamboo beds, and repairing of 23,000 square meters of old housing, in addition to greatly expanded fuel shipments to Guangxi airfields.
91. Quoted in Jenks, "China's 'Punitive War' on Vietnam," p. 803.
92. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman stated, "What we are going to do is make the US realize the importance of U.S.-China relations to prompt it to take the right track." Quoted in Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123, at p. 95.
93. Unless otherwise noted, this section draws on John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1997).
94. Quoted in ibid., p. 74, from NCNA, July 31, 1995, in FBIS-China August 1, 1995, pp. 21-23.
95. Quoted in ibid., p. 74, from NCNA, July 31, 1995, in FBIS-China August 1, 1995, pp. 21-23.
96. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
97. Quoted in ibid., citing Wenhui Bao, November 27, 1995, in FBIS-China, November 28, 1995, p. 72.
98. Quoted in ibid., citing Wenhui Bao, November 27, 1995, in FBIS-China, November 28, 1995, p. 72.
99. Ibid., pp. 99-100, citing Japanese defense ministry information. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation," was told by Chinese policymakers that Washington's apparent lack of response to the 1995 exercises showed the need for greater pressure to force a change in the U.S.- Taiwan relationship.
100. Ibid., pp. 99-100, citing Japanese defense ministry information. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation," was told by Chinese policymakers that Washington's apparent lack of response to the 1995 exercises showed the need for greater pressure to force a change in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
101. Ibid., p. 101, citing NCNA, March 4, 1996, in FBIS-China, March 5, 1996, p. 68.
102. Ibid., p. 101, citing NCNA, March 4, 1996, in FBIS-China, March 5, 1996, p. 68.
103. Jonathan D. Pollack, "The U.S. and Asia in 1996: Under Renovation but Open for Business," Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 1997), p. 98.
104. David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000), offers a comprehensive military assessment of alternative scenarios for attacking Taiwan and U.S. responses thereto.
105. For the problems of an invasion scenario, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86. In 1949 Gen. Sun Li-ren, Taiwan defense commander, estimated that the PLA could land 200,000 troops in twenty-four hours on 1,000 junks. Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 182. Sun believed that only 60,000 of his 300,000 troops were combat soldiers.
106. For the problems of an invasion scenario, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86. In 1949 Gen. Sun Li-ren, Taiwan defense commander, estimated that the PLA could land 200,000 troops in twenty-four hours on 1,000 junks. Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 182. Sun believed that only 60,000 of his 300,000 troops were combat soldiers.
107. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up," pp. 26ff., cites Lieut. Gen. Wang Houqing and Maj. Gen. Zhang Xingye, chief eds., Zhanyi Xue [Military campaign studies] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000) (military circulation only), on the need and manner of preemption with missiles and information warfare.
108. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up," pp. 26ff., cites Lieut. Gen. Wang Houqing and Maj. Gen. Zhang Xingye, chief eds., Zhanyi Xue [Military campaign studies] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000) (military circulation only), on the need and manner of preemption with missiles and information warfare.
109. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up," pp. 23 ff., spells out Beijing's ends and means for inducing Taiwan to accept the mainland terms for reunification.
110. Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies," in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), pp. 146-174; and June Teufel Dreyer, The PLA and the Kosovo Conflict (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000).
111. Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies," in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), pp. 146-174; and June Teufel Dreyer, The PLA and the Kosovo Conflict (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000).
112. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), pp. 259-304, surveys articles from 1994 to 1999 by Chinese security analysts; Rear Adm. Eric A. McVadon, USN (Ret.), "Systems Information in China's People's Liberation Army," in Mulvenon and Yang, The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, pp. 217-244.
113. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), pp. 259-304, surveys articles from 1994 to 1999 by Chinese security analysts; Rear Adm. Eric A. McVadon, USN (Ret.), "Systems Information in China's People's Liberation Army," in Mulvenon and Yang, The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, pp. 217-244.
114. Ellis Joffe, "The Military and China's New Politics: Trends and Counter-trends," in Mulvenon and Yang, The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, pp. 34-47.
115. Luo Yuan, "The Military Factor in the Cross-Strait Situation," paper presented at the Center for Strategic and International Studies conference, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2000, cited in David L. Shambaugh, Reforming China's Military (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).
116. Luo Yuan, "The Military Factor in the Cross-Strait Situation," paper presented at the Center for Strategic and International Studies conference, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2000, cited in David L. Shambaugh, Reforming China's Military (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).
117. For the most complete review of theory and practice, wholly Western oriented, see Michael Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
118. Cyrus Vance headed the delegation, which was escorted by the author. In fact, since the U.S. Seventh Fleet interposition in the Taiwan Strait in 1950, Beijing has already waited more than fifty years.
119. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up," pp. 23 ff., fully elaborates the calculations of ends and means in Beijing.
120. Ibid., p. 14.
121. Compiled by Zhang Liang with Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force against Their Own People (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), carries graphic accounts of turmoil in far-reaching areas of China.
122. Informal exchanges with more than a dozen China specialists in security affairs.
123. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up," pp. 17-21.
124. "Military Expert Wang Baoqing Envisages War with Taiwan, Zhongguo xinmenshe, September 7, 1999, in Shambaugh, Reforming China's Military.
125. "Military Expert Wang Baoqing Envisages War with Taiwan, Zhongguo xinmenshe, September 7, 1999, in Shambaugh, Reforming China's Military.
126. Christensen, "Posing Problems Without Catching Up," p. 18, citing an interview in Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), August 18, 1999.
127. You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 88 ff.; also Suisheng Zhao, "Changing Leadership Perceptions: The Adoption of a Coercive Strategy," in ibid., pp. 113ff.
128. You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 88 ff.; also Suisheng Zhao, "Changing Leadership Perceptions: The Adoption of a Coercive Strategy," in ibid., pp. 113ff.