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Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 117, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 180-200

Informal communication

(1) Olszewski, Wojciech a

a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY (United States)

Author keywords

Sender receiver games

Indexed keywords

EID: 3342956456 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.004 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (26)

References (23)

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