Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and "weak link" coordination games

Experimental Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 25-48

  Weber, Roberto A ^a   Camerer, Colin F ^b   Knez, Marc ^c  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c Lexecon Inc   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination games; Experiments; Timing

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043089857     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026257921046     Document Type: Article

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