The limitations of the positional order effect: Can it support silent threats and non-equilibrium behavior?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 313-325

  Güth, Werner ^a   Huck, Steffen ^a   Rapoport, Amnon ^b  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

C72; C91; Experiments; Non cooperative game theory; Order of play

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032519150     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00057-7     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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