Monitoring corporate performance: The role of objectivity, proximity, and adaptability in corporate governance

Cornell Law Review

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 356-393

  Boot, Arnoud W A ^a   Macey, Jonathan R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b MIT Sloan School of Management   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1342326581     PISSN: 00108847     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (58)

1. D. ACEMOGLU, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BALANCE OF POWERS (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 239, 1995).
2. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Real and Formal Authority in Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997).
3. Jerald G. Backman & Patrick M. O'Malley, Self Esteem in Young Men: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Education and Occupational Attainment, 35 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 365 (1977).
4. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002).
5. Fabrizio Barca, On Corporate Governance in Italy: Issues, Facts and Agency (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
6. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & ALMA COHEN, FIRMS' DECISIONS WHERE TO INCORPORATE (Nat'l Bureau for Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 351, 2002).
7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
8. Erik Berglof, Corporate Governance, in THE EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS: THE STATE OF THE UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE MILLENIUM 147-84 (Ben Steil ed., 1996).
9. MARCO BECHT, PATRICK BOLTON & AILSA RÖELL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL (2002).
10. Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31-51 (1993).
11. Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity and Corporate Control, 53 J. FIN. 1 (1998).
12. M.M. BLAIR & L. STOUT, A THEORY OF CORPORATION LAW AS A RESPONSE TO CONTRACTING PROBLEMS IN TEAM PRODUCTION (Brookings Institution, Working Paper, 1997).
13. Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity and Corporate Control, 53 J. FIN. 1 (1998).
14. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, The Trade-off Between Objectivity and Proximity in Corporate Governance (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Cornell Law Review).
15. Mike Burkart et al., Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q.J. Econ. 693 (1997).
16. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991).
17. Jacques Cremer, Arm's Length Relationships, 110 Q. J. ECON. 275 (1995).
18. JAMES A. FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW (1997).
19. Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will it Happen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009 (1994).
20. DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1995).
21. Peter Fritsch, Pennzoil Holder Proposes Limiting 'Poison Pill' Use, WALL ST. J, Nov. 19, 1997, at B5.
22. THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 86 (1991).
23. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986).
24. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Shareholder Rights By-Law: Doubts from Delaware, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISER, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 9.
25. SHINICHI HIROTA & KOHEI KAWAMURA, WHAT MAKES AUTONOMOUS MANAGEMENT DO WELL? CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WITHOUT EXTERNAL CONTROLS, (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working paper No. 10/2003, 2003).
26. Bengt Holmström, & Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring, 101 J. POL. ECON. 678 (1993).
27. Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982).
28. Bent Holmström & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong?, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2003).
29. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 67.
30. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993).
31. Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, MGMT. SCI., Jan. 1993, at 17.
32. Mark L. Loewenstein, Shareholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1673 (2002).
33. Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: One American's Perspective, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 121.
34. Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394 (2004).
35. Ernst Maug, Boards of Directors and Capital Structure: Alternative Forms of Corporate Restructuring, 3 J. OF CORP. FIN. 113 (1997).
36. Colin Mayer, Financial Systems and Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evidence, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 144 (1998).
37. Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653 (1999).
38. Todd T. Milbourn, Financial Systems and Corporate Governance, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 170 (1998).
39. Alan Murray, Asia's Financial Foibles Make American Way Look Like a Winner, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1997, at A1.
40. DAVID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 46-47 (1983).
41. Andrew Osterland, France is a Banana Republic: Corporate Governance is Changing in France . . . Slowly, FIN. WORLD, July-Aug. 1997, at 40-43.
42. Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Finance, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 502 (2001).
43. M. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment System, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65.
44. Matthew Rabin, PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998).
45. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, Q.J. ECON., May 1998, at 387.
46. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002).
47. MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
48. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993).
49. Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. Rev. 927, 935-37 (1983).
50. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986).
51. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
52. Roland Strausz, Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship, REV. ECON. STUD. 337 (1997).
53. V.A. WARTHER, BOARD EFFECTIVENESS AND BOARD DISSENT: A MODEL OF THE BOARD'S RELATIONSHIP TO MANAGEMENT AND SHARE-HOLDERS (1994).
54. ROBERTO WEIGMANN, RESPONSIBILITA' E POTERE LEGITTIMO DEGLI AMMINISTRATORI, 104-13 (1974).
55. Ralph K. White, Selective Inattention, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1971, at 47, 82.
56. Yishay Yafeh & Oved Yosha, Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?, 113 ECON. J. 128 (2003).
57. Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 125-48 (1994).
58. Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1997).