Financial systems and corporate governance: A review of the international evidence

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 154, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 144-165

  Mayer, Colin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032221062     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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