Incentives and Coordination in Hierarchies

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2001, Pages

  Mookherjee, Dilip ^a   Reichelstein, Stefan ^b  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

control loss; coordination; hierarchies; incentives; networks; organization theory; profit centers

Indexed keywords

EID: 85108904295     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351704     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1009     Document Type: Article

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