Using stock price information to regulate firms

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 169-190

  Faure Grimaud, Antoine ^a,b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL POLICY; PRIVATE SECTOR; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; STOCK MARKET;

EID: 0036179662     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00202     Document Type: Article

References (39)

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