Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 389-404

  D'Aspremont, Claude ^a   Bhattacharya, Sudipto ^b   Gérard Varet, Louis André ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^c Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

Development efforts; Knowledge sharing; Public good

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000051541     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00050-5     Document Type: Article

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