One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-25

  Amir, Rabah ^a   Wooders, John ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Oligopolistic R D; One way spillovers; Research joint ventures; Submodularity

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037688363     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0734     Document Type: Article

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