Monetary policy uncertainty and inflation: The role of central bank accountability

Economist

Volumn 146, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 585-602

  Schaling, Eric ^a   Nolan, Charles ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG   (South Africa)

^b BANK OF ENGLAND   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asymmetries; Non linearities; Preference uncertainty; Transparency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001138280     PISSN: 0013063X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1003494413926     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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