Announcements, inflation targeting and central bank incentives

Economica

Volumn 66, Issue 262, 1999, Pages 255-269

  Walsh, Carl E ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; INFLATION;

EID: 0032771466     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00168     Document Type: Article

References (33)

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