Harassment, corruption and tax policy

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 75-94

  Marjit, Sugata ^a   Mukherjee, Vivekananda ^b   Mukherjee, Arijit ^c  

^a CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES   (India)

^b RKM Residential College   (India)

^c EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Corruption; Filing; Harassment; K42

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041622079     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(99)00048-8     Document Type: Article

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