Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 64, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 411-426

  Agastya, Murali ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009603777     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2971721     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. AUMANN, R. J. and MASCHLER, M. (1985), "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem From the Talmud", Journal of Economic Theory, 346, 195-213.
2. EDGEWORTH, Y. F. (1881) Mathematical Physics (London: Kegan).
3. EDGEWORTH, Y. F. (1925) Papers Relating to Political Economy, Volume 2 (London: Macmillan and Co.).
4. CHATTERJEE, K., DUTTA, B., RAY, D. and SENGUPTA, K., (1993), "A Non-Cooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining", Review of Economic Studies, 60, 463-477.
5. FELLER, W. (1968) An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Volume 1 (3rd Ed.) (New York: John Wiley).
6. FUDENBERG, D. and TIROLE, J. (1991) Game Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press).
7. HART, O. D. and MOORE, J. (1988), "Property Rights and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1119-1158.
8. JORDAN, J. S. (1992), "Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games", Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 60-81.
9. KALAI, E. and LEHRER, E. (1993), "Rational Learning Leading to Nash Equilibrium", Econometrica, 61, 1019-1045.
10. LUCE, D. R. and RAIFFA, H. (1957) Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc).
11. MILGROM, P. and ROBERTS, J. (1991), "Adaptive Learning and Sophisticated Learning in Normal Form Games", Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 82-100.
12. MOULIN, H. (1988) Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making (New York: Cambridge University Press).
13. NASH, J. (1953), "Two-person Cooperative Games", Econometrica, 21, 128-140.
14. PERRY, M. and RENY, P. (1991), "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation" (Mimeo, University of Western Ontario).
15. RUBINSTEIN, A. (1982), "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model", Econometrica, 50, 97-109.
16. SELTEN, R. (1981), "A Non-Cooperative Model of Characteristic Function Bargaining", in Bohm, V. and Nachtkamp, H. (eds.), Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honour of Oskar Morgenstern (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut).
17. SHAPLEY, L. S. (1971), "Core of Convex Games", International Journal of Game Theory, 1, 11-26.
18. YOUNG, H. P. (1985) Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles, Applications (Amsterdam: North-Holland).
19. YOUNG, H. P. (1993a), "The Evolution of Conventions", Econometrica, 61, 57-84.
20. YOUNG, H. P. (19936), "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining", Journal of Economic Theory, 59, 1, 145-168.