Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 207-233

  Agastya, Murali ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009575430     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2574     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Agastya M. Adaptive play in multiplayer bargaining situations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 1997.
2. Aumann R. J., Maschler M. Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. J. Econ. Theory. 1985;195-213.
3. K. G. Binmore, Bargaining and coalitions, in, Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, (, A. E. Roth, Ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK.
4. Binmore K. G., Dasgupta P. Nash bargaining theory: An introduction. Binmore K. G., Dasgupta P. The Economics of Bargaining. 1987;Blackwell, Oxford.
5. Dutta B., Ray D. Constrained egalitarian allocations. Econometrica. 1990;463-477.
6. Foster D., Young H. P. Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. Theor. Pop. Biol. 38:1990;219-232.
7. Friedlin M., Wentzell A. Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems. 1984;Springer-Verlag, New York.
8. Kandori M., Mailath G., Rob R. Learning, mutation and long-run equilibrium in games. Econometrica. 61:1993;25-56.
9. P. Riviera, Evolution in cooperative games, mimeo, Université Paris VI Jussieu, Paris, France, 1995.
10. Young H. P. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica. 61:1993;57-84.
11. Young H. P. An evolutionary model of bargaining. J. Econ. Theory. 59:1993;145-168.