How much common belief is necessary for a convention?

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 252-268

  Shin, Hyun Song ^a   Williamson, Timothy ^b,c  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030121908     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0036     Document Type: Article

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