Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 87, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 72-94

  Bag, Parimal Kanti ^a   Winter, Eyal ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001806460     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2497     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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