Country size and the voluntary provision of international public goods

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 619-638

  Boadway, Robin ^a   Hayashi, Masayoshi ^b  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b MEIJI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

International public goods; Voluntary provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033228572     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(99)00029-4     Document Type: Article

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