Public goods and political institutions: Trade and monetary policy processes in the United States

International Organization

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 1988, Pages 15-32

  Gowa, Joanne ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003084280     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300007190     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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