Coordination, organizational boundaries and fads in business practices

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 89-112

  Camerer, Colin ^a   Knez, Marc ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0004747750     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/5.1.89     Document Type: Article

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