Dynamic focal points in N-person coordination games

Theory and Decision

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 277-313

  Kramarz, F ^a  

^a CREST   (France)

Author keywords

Coordination game; Focal point; Language; N player game

Indexed keywords

COORDINATION; LANGUAGE; N PERSON GAME; PLAYER STRATEGY; REPEATED GAME; UNCERTAINTY;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0030365831     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00134211     Document Type: Article

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