Precedent transfer in experimental conflict-of-interest games

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 239-249

  Knez, Marc ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

C72; C92; Coordination; Experimental economics; Precedent

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032519149     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00053-X     Document Type: Article

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