Containing fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict

International Security

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 41-75

  Lake, David A ^a   Rothchild, Donald ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030508030     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.21.2.41     Document Type: Article

References (83)

1. Kathleen Newland. "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 161.
2. Vesna Pešić, Remarks to the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) Working Group on the International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, October 1, 1994.
3. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, pp. 103-124. See also Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," in ibid., pp. 79-101.
4. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, pp. 103-124. See also Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," in ibid., pp. 79-101.
5. This is, of course, not true as a universal rule. Although ethnic identities are often strong, groups can also form along class, religious, or other lines. The more politically salient ethnicity is, however, the more likely it is that groups will organize on this basis. This is an important way in which the between-group and within-group variables examined here interact.
6. Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 34-37; and Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 216.
7. Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 34-37; and Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 216.
8. Claude Ake, "Why Is Africa Not Developing?" West Africa, No. 3538 (June 17, 1985), p. 1213.
9. Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 69-70.
10. James Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem," unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 1993; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.
11. James Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem," unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 1993; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.
12. Moreover, a mutually preferred bargain must exist even if the resources available to groups are declining, because violence only further reduces the resource pool relative to possible agreements. For an empirical demonstration of this point, see Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Rwanda (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1995).
13. The following two sub-sections draw heavily upon Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem," and "Rationalist Explanations for War," two of the best theoretical works on conflict between organized groups.
14. In game-theoretic terms, actors will choose to bluff depending upon 1) the beliefs each actor holds about the other's "type" (i.e., the actor is more likely to bluff if it believes the other is "weak" and the second actor believes the first is "strong") and 2) the relative benefits (payoff) and costs (signal) of successful bluffing, unsuccessful bluffing, and not bluffing (i.e., the higher the payoff from success and the smaller the cost of the signal, the more likely the actor is to bluff).
15. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," p. 400.
16. The term "ethnic contract" was, we believe, coined by Leonard Binder at the first meeting of the IGCC Working Group on the International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, May 13-14, 1994. On relational contracting more generally, see Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting (New York: Free Press, 1985); for an application to inter-state relations, see David A. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 1-33
17. The term "ethnic contract" was, we believe, coined by Leonard Binder at the first meeting of the IGCC Working Group on the International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, May 13-14, 1994. On relational contracting more generally, see Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting (New York: Free Press, 1985); for an application to inter-state relations, see David A. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 1-33
18. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Weingast, "Constructing Trust."
19. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Weingast, "Constructing Trust."
20. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Weingast, "Constructing Trust."
21. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Weingast, "Constructing Trust."
22. Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, "South Africa: The Opening of the Apartheid Mind," in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 226-250.
23. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin Books, 1992); and Hardin, One for All, pp. 58 and 159.
24. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin Books, 1992); and Hardin, One for All, pp. 58 and 159.
25. Weingast, "Constructing Trust," p. 15. Aleksa Djilas, "Fear thy Neighbor: The Breakup of Yugoslavia," in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 99, argues that the communist party served as the primary safeguard in Yugoslavia, largely through coercion and repression, and that the defeat of the party in the 1990 elections left a political vacuum. He faults the party for not developing "stable institutions" that could have regulated relations among the republics. In "Constructing Trust," on the other hand, Weingast credits Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito for constructing a set of veto mechanisms institutionalizing trust among the groups.
26. Weingast, "Constructing Trust," p. 15. Aleksa Djilas, "Fear thy Neighbor: The Breakup of Yugoslavia," in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 99, argues that the communist party served as the primary safeguard in Yugoslavia, largely through coercion and repression, and that the defeat of the party in the 1990 elections left a political vacuum. He faults the party for not developing "stable institutions" that could have regulated relations among the republics. In "Constructing Trust," on the other hand, Weingast credits Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito for constructing a set of veto mechanisms institutionalizing trust among the groups.
27. Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem"; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War"; see also Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement. See Weingast, "Constructing Trust"; this model is also discussed in Robert H. Bates and Barry R. Weingast, "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995.
28. Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem"; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War"; see also Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement. See Weingast, "Constructing Trust"; this model is also discussed in Robert H. Bates and Barry R. Weingast, "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995.
29. Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem"; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War"; see also Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement. See Weingast, "Constructing Trust"; this model is also discussed in Robert H. Bates and Barry R. Weingast, "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995.
30. Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem"; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War"; see also Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement. See Weingast, "Constructing Trust"; this model is also discussed in Robert H. Bates and Barry R. Weingast, "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995.
31. Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem"; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War"; see also Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement. See Weingast, "Constructing Trust"; this model is also discussed in Robert H. Bates and Barry R. Weingast, "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995.
32. Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem"; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War"; see also Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement. See Weingast, "Constructing Trust"; this model is also discussed in Robert H. Bates and Barry R. Weingast, "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995.
33. Hardin, One for All, p. 56.
34. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," p. 104.
35. We recognize that some readers may prefer the broader use of the term "security dilemma." We believe that the distinctions between information failures, problems of credible commitment, and incentives to use force preemptively are useful and important, and we see no reason to use a less precise catchall term when more precise and analytically refined definitions are available.
36. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-213. See also George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley, 1977).
37. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-213. See also George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley, 1977).
38. Stephen M. Saideman, "Is Pandora's Box Half-Empty or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement.
39. Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.
40. Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.
41. Weingast, "Constructing Trust," p. 20.
42. Warren Weinstein, "Conflict and Confrontation in Central Africa: The Revolt in Burundi," Africa Today, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Fall 1972), p. 27.
43. I. William Zartman, "Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement.
44. Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing" (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1995), pp. 74-75.
45. Amnesty International, "The Tears of Orphans": No Future Without Human Rights (New York: Amnesty International, 1995), p. 57.
46. Sudan Democratic Gazette, No. 53 (October 1994), p. 3.
47. Larry L. Watts, "Ethnic Tensions: How the West Can Help," World Policy Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 92-93.
48. C.E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).
49. "SA Will Pay Price For New Constitution: FW," ANC Daily News Briefing, May 9, 1996, p. 9, as transmitted on gopher://gopher.anc.org.za:70/00/anc/newsbrief/1996/news0509.
50. Donald Rothchild, "Hegemonial Exchange: An Alternative Model for Managing Conflict in Middle Africa," in Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen, eds., Ethnicity, Politics, and Development (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1986), p. 72.
51. Robert B. Mattes, "Beyond 'Government and Opposition': An Independent South African Legislature," Politikon, Vol. 20, No. 2 (December 1993), p. 76.
52. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 26.
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54. Cameron McWhirter and Gur Melamede, "Ethiopia: The Ethnicity Factor," Africa Report, Vol. 37, No. 5 (September/October, 1992) p. 33.
55. Gail W. Lapidus and Renée de Nevers, eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Identity and Conflict Management in Russia Today (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1995), p. 3.
56. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 79.
57. Stephen D. Krasner and Daniel K. Froats, "The Westphalian Model and Minority-Rights Guarantees in Europe," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement. See also Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 115-151.
58. Stephen D. Krasner and Daniel K. Froats, "The Westphalian Model and Minority-Rights Guarantees in Europe," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement. See also Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 115-151.
59. Stephen D. Krasner and Daniel K. Froats, "The Westphalian Model and Minority-Rights Guarantees in Europe," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement. See also Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 115-151.
60. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 9.
61. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 1 (October 1982), pp. 1-24.
62. Edmond J. Keller, "Transnational Ethnic Conflict in Africa," in Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement.
63. V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 139.
64. Harry R. Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1978).
65. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa.
66. For discussions of the motivations of outside states to intervene in ethnic conflicts, see Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security, pp. 16-20, and Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," in ibid., p. 197.
67. For discussions of the motivations of outside states to intervene in ethnic conflicts, see Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security, pp. 16-20, and Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," in ibid., p. 197.
68. On "hurting stalemates," see I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). On the inevitable political implications of intervention, see Caleb Carr, "The Consequences of Somalia," World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 1-4.
69. On "hurting stalemates," see I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). On the inevitable political implications of intervention, see Caleb Carr, "The Consequences of Somalia," World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 1-4.
70. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peace-making and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).
71. Donald Wittman, "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 1979), pp. 743-763.
72. Milošević's role in the October 1995 negotiations carried with it an implied threat: if the Bosnian Serbs refused to be more accommodating at the bargaining table, their Serb kinsmen across the border could further reduce their military support.
73. Stephen J. Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wars: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991); and Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail," unpublished paper, Columbia University, 1995.
74. Stephen J. Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wars: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991); and Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail," unpublished paper, Columbia University, 1995.
75. Virginia P. Fortna, "Success and Failure in Southern Africa: Peacekeeping in Namibia and Angola," in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), pp. 282-299.
76. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
77. Djilas, "Fear thy Neighbor: The Breakup of Yugoslavia," p. 102.
78. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (September 1995), p. 684; Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wars, pp. 5-7; Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 25.
79. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (September 1995), p. 684; Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wars, pp. 5-7; Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 25.
80. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (September 1995), p. 684; Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wars, pp. 5-7; Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 25.
81. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars."
82. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution, p. 232.
83. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 1994), p. 8.