Agents and structures: two views of preferences, two views of institutions

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 245-270

  Clark, William Roberts ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DOMESTIC POLITICS; INSTITUTIONALISM; SOCIAL STRUCTURE;

EID: 0031693417     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2478.00081     Document Type: Article

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