3. The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 1994, Pages 449-472

  Snidal, Duncan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

collective action; cooperation; heterogeneity; institutions; international regimes

Indexed keywords

EID: 84965400296     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006004003     Document Type: Article

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