Studying institutions: Some lessons from the rational choice approach

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 1989, Pages 131-147

  Shepsle, Kenneth A ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

formal political theory; institutions; political economy; rational choice; structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 84970437408     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692889001002002     Document Type: Article

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