The agent-structure problem in international relations theory

International organization

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 1987, Pages 335-370

  Wendt, Alexander E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84974183553     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S002081830002751X     Document Type: Article

References (73)

1. There are a number of discussions of the meanings and uses of “structural theory” in neorealism and world-system theory, but as far as I know, none explicitly compares or differentiates the neorealist and world-system approaches to structure and structural analysis. On neorealism see, for example, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Ada Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, D.C.: APSA, 1983). The best critique of neorealism's conception of structure is Richard Ashley's “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International organization 38 (Spring 1984), pp. 225–86. On world-system theory see Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 16 (September 1974), pp. 387–415, and Christopher Chase-Dunn and Richard Rubinson, “Toward a Structural Perspective on the World-System,” Politics and Society 7 (no. 4, 1977), pp. 453–76. The critique of world-system theory that comes closest to my concerns in this article is probably Theda Skocpol's “Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” American Journal of Sociology 82 (March 1977), pp. 1075–90.
2. Whether or not scientific realism is the “new orthodoxy” in the philosophy of natural science is undoubtedly a contentious issue among realists and empiricists, but it has in any case made sufficient inroads that the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science, long an important bastion of empiricism, held a year-long institute in 1985/86 which, among other things, focused explicitly on that question. American political scientists generally seem to be unaware of or uninterested in this debate and its potential implications for political science. To my knowledge, the only discussions of scientific realism in international relations are British: John Maclean, “Marxist Epistemology, Explanations of Change and the Study of International Relations,” in Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones, eds., Change in the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension (London: Frances Pinter, 1981), pp. 46–67, and Richard Little, “The Systems Approach,” in Steve Smith, ed., International Relations: British and American Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 79–91.
3. The agent-structure problem has, in various guises, recently emerged as something of a cottage industry throughout the social sciences. For a sampling of this work: in geography, see Derek Gregory, “Human Agency and Human Geography,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 6 (no. 1, 1981), pp. 1–18, and Derek Gregory and John Urry, eds., Social Relations and Spatial Structures (London: MacMillan, 1985); in sociology, in addition to the work of Giddens and Bhaskar already cited, see Alan Dawe, “Theories of Social Action,” in Tom Bottomore and Robert Nisbet, eds., A History of Sociological Analysis (London: Heinemann, 1979), and Karin Knorr-Cetina and Aaron Cicourel, eds., Advances in Social Theory: Toward an Integration of Micro and Macro-Sociologies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981); in social history, see Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), and Christopher Lloyd, Explanation in Social History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); in the philosophy of social science, see John O'Neill, ed., Modes of Individualism and Collectivism (New York: St. Martins, 1973), and David-Hillel Ruben, The Metaphysics of the Social World (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985); in Marxist theory, see Edward Thompson's polemic in The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978) against the structural Marxism of Louis Althusser, and the commentaries on this debate by Perry Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism (London: Verso, 1980), and Nicos Mouzelis, “Reductionism in Marxist Theory,” Telos 45 (Fall 1980), pp. 173-85; and in international relations, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, and James Rosenau, “Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics,” International organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 849–94.
4. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 18.
5. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Richard Ashley, “Three Modes of Economism,” International Studies Quarterly 27 (December 1983), pp. 463-96; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” World Politics 38 (October 1985), pp. 25–57.
6. See Spiro Latsis, “Situational Determinism in Economics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (August 1972), pp. 207–45, and the reply by Fritz Machlup, “Situational Determinism in Economics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (September 1974), pp. 271–84.
7. Examples of such an approach in international relations might include Graham Allision, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) and John Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
8. This is probably the most persistently cited problem in the individualist program of reducing all social scientific explanations to the properties of individuals or their interactions. See, for example, Maurice Mandelbaum, “Societal Facts,” British Journal of Sociology 6 (1955); Steven Lukes, “Methodological Individualism Reconsidered,” British Journal of Sociology 19 (June 1968), pp. 119-29; Harold Kincaid, “Reduction, Explanation, and Individualism,” Philosophy of Science 53 (December 1986), pp. 492–513.
9. “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 340.
10. The debate over the validity of theories built on the assumption that the social world operates “as if” certain things were true is a long one, so my saying that such reasoning is “untenable” is, of course, contentious. The terms of the debate were first defined by Milton Friedman's “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in his Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), a piece which initiated a lively debate with Paul Samuelson and others in the pages of the American Economic Review in the early 1960s. For a particularly cogent argument that “as if” reasoning is inconsistent even with the logical empiricist conception of scientific explanation that informed Friedman's seminal contribution, see Terry Moe, “On the Scientific Status of Rational Models,” American Journal of Political Science 23 (February 1979), pp. 215–43.
11. As far as I know, no neo-Marxist has used game-theoretic language to characterize international economic relations between the advanced industrialized countries. But clearly, because of their very different theoretical understanding of the state, neo-Marxist scholars are much less likely than neorealists to see those relations in mercantilist, and therefore politically fragile, terms; see, for example, Robin Murray, “The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation-State,” New Left Review 67 (May-June 1971), pp. 84–109, and John Willoughby, “The Changing Role of Protection in the World Economy,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 6 (June 1982), pp. 195–211. The issue in this article, of course, is not which view is actually correct, but rather how to develop an approach to the agent-structure problem which ensures at least the possibility of determining which is correct, that is, of developing a theory of states in international economic structures.
12. Douglas Maynard and Thomas Wilson, “On the Reification of Social Structure,” in Scott McNall and Gary Howe, eds., Current Perspectives in Social Theory, vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1980), p. 287.
13. The structural Marxist approach to the agent-structure problem is discussed in Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970), pp. 180–81, and in Steven Smith, Reading Althusser (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 192–200. It should be noted, however, that despite the similarities between world-system theory and structural Marxism with respect to their understandings of the agent-structure relationship, they differ in important ways on other issues, such as the conceptualization of the capitalist mode of production. See, for example, Gary Howe and Alan Sica, “Political Economy, Imperialism, and the Problem of World-System Theory,” in McNall and Howe, Current Perspectives in Social Theory, pp. 235–86.
14. Smith, Reading Althusser, p. 177.
15. They disagree, however, about the exact meaning of this term, that is, about whether totalities are “expressive” or “structured.” On these differences, see Michael Burawoy, “Contemporary Currents in Marxist Theory,” in Scott McNall, ed., Theoretical Perspectives in Sociology (New York: St. Martins, 1979), pp. 16–39, and Harvey Kaye, “Totality: Its Application to Historical and Social Analysis by Wallerstein and Genovese,” Historical Reflections 6 (Winter 1979), pp. 405–19.
16. My generative reading of world-system theory's conceptualization of structure is characteristic only of the “qualitative” (and at this point, apparently the minority) school of world-system theorists represented, for example, by Wallerstein and Terence Hopkins. Actually, the recent debate between qualitative and quantitative world-system theorists is an interesting example of a quite explicit tension within a single research community between scientific realist and empiricist conceptions of the ontology and methodology of structural analysis. On this debate see, for example, Richard Little, “The Systems Approach,” in Steve Smith, ed., International Relations, British and American Perspectives (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 71–91, and Peter Taylor, “The Poverty of International Comparisons: Some Methodological Lessons from World-Systems Analysis” (Department of Geography, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1985).
17. Useful discussions of this distinction include Bertell Oilman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 26–40, and Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, pp. 53–55.
18. This tendency is one of the most persistently cited criticisms of at least the early work in world-system theory. See, for example, Robert Duplessis, “From Demesne to World-System: A Critical Review of the Literature on the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism,” Radical History Review 3 (Fall 1976), pp. 3–41, and Skocpol, “Wallerstein's World Capitalist System.”
19. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Joan Sokolovsky, “Interstate Systems, World-Empires and the Capitalist World-Economy: A Response to Thompson,” International Studies Quarterly 27 (September 1983), pp. 357–67.
20. Christopher Chase-Dunn, “Socialist States in the Capitalist World-Economy,” in his Socialist States in the World-System (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 21–56.
21. Derek Layder, “Problems in Accounting for the Individual in Marxist-Rationalist Theoretical Discourse,” British Journal of Sociology 30 (June 1979), p. 150.
22. Emile Durkheim makes exactly this point in The Rules of Sociological Method (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1938), p. 90, when he says that “to show how a fact is useful is not to explain how it originated or why it is what it is. The uses which it serves presuppose the specific properties characterizing it, but do not create them. The need we have of things cannot give them existence, nor can it confer their specific nature upon them. It is to causes of another sort that they owe their existence.”
23. See, for example, Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I (New York: Academic Press, 1974), especially chap. 1.
24. Brenner, “The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,” New Left Review 104 (July-August 1977), pp. 25–92.
25. See, for example, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff, “The Theory of Transitional Conjunctures and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism,” Review of Radical Political Economics 11 (Fall 1979), pp. 3–22, and the response in the same issue by Herbert Gintis, “On the Theory of Transitional Conjunctures,” pp. 23–31.
26. See, for example, I. Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 112–46.
27. State, Power, Socialism (London: Verso, 1978); see also Bob Jessop, Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy (New York: St. Martins, 1985).
28. This kind of dismissal is an old individualist move; see, for example, May Brodbeck's juxtaposition of methodological individualism with “metaphysical” holism in her “Methodological Individualisms: Definition and Reduction,” in O'Neill, Modes of Individualism and Collectivism, pp. 289–90. More recently, “analytical Marxists” have resurrected this argument to motivate a reconstruction of Marxist theory on “micro foundations”; see Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3–8. In this latter context, it is perhaps worth noting that a number of social scientific realists have argued that Marxist theory is best understood in realist, rather than empiricist, terms and therefore does not need to be reconstructed on microfoundations to be “scientific”; see Russell Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 96–118, and James Farr, “Marx's Laws,” Political Studies 34 (June 1986), pp. 202–22.
29. T. terms “empiricist” and “scientific realist” are the labels the participants in this debate, most of whom are philosophers of natural science, use to describe themselves. Some of the important contributions and overviews are Hilary Putnam, Mathematics, Matter, and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Richard Boyd, “On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism,” Erkenntnis 19 (May 1983), pp. 45-90; Jerrold Aronson, A Realist Philosophy of Science (New York: St. Martins, 1984); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Wesley Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker, eds., Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985).
30. The most explicit recent discussion of the philosophy of science underlying neorealism of which I am aware is the symposium around Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's “Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View,” International Studies Quarterly 29 (June 1985), pp. 121–36. Bueno de Mesquita's emphasis on deductive analysis and logical proof, rather than the identification of potentially unobservable causal mechanisms, as the foundation of scientific explanation displays a clearly empiricist epistemological orientation. The explicit statements on philosophy of science by at least the quantitative school of world-system theorists show a similar reliance on empiricist arguments; see, for example, Christopher Chase Dunn, “The Kernel of the Capitalist World-Economy: Three Approaches,” in Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches, pp. 55–78.
31. Abduction is also known as “retroduction.” Useful discussions of abduction are found in Norwood Hanson, “Retroduction and the Logic of Scientific Discovery,” in Leonard Krimerman, ed., The Nature and Scope of Social Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 73–83, and Boyd, “On the Current Status of Scientific Realism,” especially pp. 72–89. An unusually detailed and explicit illustration of abductive reasoning in the social sciences (and thus supporting my earlier suggestion that some social scientists are practicing scientific realists) is found in Elinor Ostrom's “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions,” Public Choice 48 (no. 1, 1986), p. 19.
32. Aronson, A Realist Philosophy of Science, p. 261.
33. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, p. 16.
34. Hacking, Representing and Intervening; Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell, “The Causal Assumptions of Quasi-Experimental Practice,” Synthese 68 (July 1986), especially pp. 169–72.
35. Alison Wylie, “Arguments for Scientific Realism: The Ascending Spiral,” American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (July 1986), pp. 287–97.
36. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, p. 22. Geoffrey Hellman, “Realist Principles,” Philosophy of Science 50 (June 1983), especially pp. 231–32.
37. See, for example, Putnam, Matter, Mathematics, and Method; Boyd, “On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism”; Richard Schlagel, “A Reasonable Reply to Hume's Skepticism,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December 1984), pp. 359–74.
38. See Ernan McMullin, “Two Ideals of Explanation in Natural Science,” in Peter French, et al., eds., Causation and Causal Theories (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 205–20, and the three-way debate between Philip Kitcher, Bas van Fraassen, and Wesley Salmon in “Approaches to Explanation,” The Journal of Philosophy 82 (November 1985), pp. 632–54.
39. Rom Harre and Edward Madden, Causal Powers (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975); Salmon, Scientific Explanation; Schlagel, “Hume's Skepticism.”
40. Hence behavioral social scientists emphasis on quantitative analysis to discover law-like regularities, rather than qualitative analysis and theory to identify causal mechanisms. On the empiricist model, we cannot have science without (relatively) “constant” conjunctions. For a useful more or less realist critique of this model of causation as it relates to social science, see Daniel Hausman, “Are There Causal Relations among Dependent Variables?” Philosophy of Science 50 (March 1983), pp. 58–81.
41. Some realist accounts of causation, and particularly the account of Harre and Madden, have been accused of implying an Aristotelian “essentialism”—the explanation of observable phenomena in terms of occult and impenetrable “essences”; see, for example, David Miller, “Back to Aristotle,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (February 1972), pp, 69–78, and Fred Wilson, “Harre and Madden on Analyzing Dispositional Concepts,” Philosophy of Science 52 (December 1985), pp. 591–607. Other realists, however, emphasize that this objection can be vitiated by explaining causal powers in terms of the physical properties and social relations which underlie them; Schlagel, “Hume's Skepticism.”
42. Russell Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 31.
43. Ira Cohen makes this particular distinction in “The Status of Structuration Theory: A Reply to McLennan,” Theory, Culture, and Society 3 (no. 1, 1986), pp. 123–34. Nigel Thrift makes a similar point, arguing that structuration theory is more meta-theory than theory in “Bear and Mouse or Bear and Tree? Anthony Giddens Reconstitution of Social Theory,” Sociology 19 (November 1985), pp. 609–23.
44. Thrift, “On the Determination of Social Action in Space and Time,” p. 30.
45. Adapted from ibid., pp. 28–32.
46. Ibid., p. 30.
47. I. his Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), Giddens indicates (p.14) that he also accepts a realist conception of science, but his realism is generally less explicit and thus more attenuated than Bhaskar's. A more important reason for relying on Bhaskar rather than Giddens, however, is the latter's weaker conception of social structure as rules and resources rather than as a set of real but unobservable internal relations, a conception which is arguably ultimately voluntarist in its implications; see for example, Alex Callinicos, “Anthony Giddens: A Contemporary Critique,” Theory and Society 14 (March 1985), pp. 133–66.
48. See, for example, Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, especially pp. 47-56; Peter Manicas, The Concept of Social Structure,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 10 (July 1980), pp. 65-82; Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science, p. 121; Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (London: Hutchinson, 1984), pp. 80–87.
49. Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science, postscript.
50. On the definition of structure in mathematics see, for example, Marc Barbut, “On the Meaning of the Word Structure in Mathematics,” in M. Lane, ed., Structuralism: A Reader (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), Michael Resnick, “Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Ontology and Reference,” Nous 15 (November 1981), pp. 529–50, and Stewart Shapiro, “Mathematics and Reality,” Philosophy of Science 50 (December 1983), pp. 523–48. Modern physics, in turn, is based on group theory (the mathematical theory of binary systems), which is explicitly combinatorial and possibilistic in its view of structure. I should probably note, however, that although I emphasize this similarity in social and natural scientific conceptions of structure, I am not saying that social science should be social physics. I am only trying to justify a certain kind of thinking and explanation in social science by pointing out that it pervades the natural sciences as well.
51. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, pp. 48-49; on the differences between natural and social structures, see also Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory (London: Hutchinson, 1977), pp. 118–19.
52. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, pp. 48–49.
53. Adapted from Giddens, The Constitution of Society, pp. 5–6.
54. For a discussion of the balance of power that is consistent in its substance, if not in its philosophical rationale, with the interpretation I suggest, see Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” pp. 276–79.
55. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p. 69.
56. R. Bhaskar, “Emergence, Explanation, and Emancipation,” in Paul Secord, ed., Explaining Human Behavior (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 286.
57. The most extensive use of an explicitly structurationist perspective in empirical research is probably Allan Pred, Place, Practice, and Structure (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1986). In his Explanation in Social History, however, Lloyd argues (p. 306) that the work of a number of prestructuration theorists has a distinctly structurationist “structure,” including, for example, the works of Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), and Alain Touraine, The Self-Production of Society (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977), and Abrams, Historical Sociology.
58. Sayer, Method in Social Science; Sylvan and Glassner, A Rationalist Methodology.
59. The implications of the epistemological distinctions between different kinds of questions are brought out systematically in Alan Garfinkel, Forms of Explanation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), especially pp. 21–48. Despite its explicitly anti-realist ontological perspective, van Fraassen's The Scientific Image is also quite good on the logic or “pragmatics” of different types of explanations.
60. In Method in Social Science, Sayer argues (p. 217) that a failure to recognize these limitations of structural analysis is responsible for the deterministic, or what he calls “pseudo concrete,” quality of much Marxist research.
61. Sayer, Method in Social Science, p. 216.
62. T. term “structural-historical” is from Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. ix-xiv, while “dialectical” is from Sylvan and Glassner, A Rationalist Methodology, pp. 154–59; both terms parallel the relationship between “abstract” and “concrete” research in Sayer's Method in Social Science. Although he does not use either of these terms, Peter Manicas provides a good illustration of the logic and implications of this form of inquiry in his critique of Theda Skocpol's State and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); see his review in History and Theory 20 (no. 2, 1981), pp. 204–18.
63. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 80–81. This notion of “bracketing” is a focal point of some of the major critiques of structuration theory; see, for example, Margaret Archer, “Morphogenesis versus Structuration: On Combining Structure and Action,” British Journal of Sociology 33 (December 1982), pp. 455–83, and Nicky Gregson, “On Duality and Dualism: The Case of Structuration Theory and Time Geography,” Progress in Human Geography 10 (June 1986), pp. 184–205.
64. Stephen Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-79; Robert Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973), pp. 467–90.
65. Prominent examples of neo-Marxist state theory include John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, eds., State and Capital: A Marxist Debate (London: Edward Arnold, 1978); Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism; and Goran Therborn What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1978). Weberian critiques include Theda Skocpol, “Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal,” Politics and Society 10 (no. 2, 1981), pp. 155–201, and Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” European Journal of Sociology 25 (no. 2, 1984), pp. 185–213.
66. Examples of the “productionist” critique of world-system theory include Brenner, “The Origins of Capitalist Development,” and Howe and Sica, “Political Economy, Imperialism, and the Problem of World-System Theory.” The alternative conceptualization of the structure of the capitalist world economy (in terms of a global mode of production) has been most fully developed by the “internationalization of capital” school of Marxist political economy; see Christian Palloix, “The Self-Expansion of Capital on a World Scale,” Review of Radical Political Economics 9 (Summer 1977), pp. 1–28.
67. Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism; Nicos Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery (New York: St. Martins, 1986); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
68. Bruce Andrews, “Social Rules and the State as a Social Actor,” World Politics 27 (July 1975), pp. 521-40; Robert Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” Millenium 12 (Summer 1983), 75; Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation”; Ashley, “The Poverty of Neo Realism,” and “Social Will and International Anarchy: Beyond the Domestic Analogy in the Study of Global Collaboration,” in Hayward Alker and Ashley, Anarchy, Power, Community: Understanding International Cooperation (forthcoming). Despite the potential usefulness of this research to the structurationist problematic, however, some of these scholars would probably reject association with that theory, especially insofar as it is grounded in realist philosophy of science.
69. Aidan Foster-Carter, “The Modes of Production Controversy,” New Left Review 107 (January-February 1978), pp. 47-77; Harold Wolpe, ed., The Articulation of Modes of Production (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).
70. J.D. Singer, “The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77–92.
71. Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); James March and Johan Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984), pp. 734–48.
72. Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975).
73. R. Bhaskar, “Scientific Explanation and Human Emancipation,” Radical Philosophy 26 (1980), pp. 16-26; Christopher Dandeker, “Theory and Practice in Sociology: The Critical Imperatives of Realism,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 13 (July 1983), pp. 195–210.