A General Game-Theoretic Model of Preference Adaptations in Problematic Social Situations

Rationality and Society

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1990, Pages 67-93

  Raub, Werner ^a  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

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Indexed keywords

EID: 84964184333     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: 14617358     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1043463190002001004     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. Harsanyi, John C., and Reinhard Selten. 1988. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Cambridge: MIT Press.
4. Radner, Roy. 1980. Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives. Journal of Economic Theory 22: 136-154.
5. Rapoport, Anatol, and Melvin Guyer. 1966. A taxonomy of 2 × 2 Games. General Systems 11: 203-214.
6. Raub, Werner. 1988. Problematic social situations and the “large-number dilemma”: A game-theoretical analysis. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 13: 311-357.
7. Raub, Werner. 1989. Hostage games. Department of Social Sciences, University of Utrecht. Mimeo.
8. Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The strategy of conflict. London: Oxford University Press.
9. Sen, Amartya. 1974. Choice, orderings and morality. In Choice, welfare and measurement, pp. 74-83, reprint. Oxford: Blackwell.
10. Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.