The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy

American Political Science Review

Volumn 83, Issue 1, 1989, Pages 77-91

  Tsebelis, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971792334     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1956435     Document Type: Article

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