Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England

The Journal of Economic History

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 1989, Pages 803-832

  North, Douglass C ^a   Weingast, Barry R ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84974486152     PISSN: 00220507     EISSN: 14716372     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022050700009451     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Oliver Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, 1985), pp. 48-49.
2. Jeremy Bullow and Kenneth Rogoff, “A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt”, Journal of Political Economy, 97 (Feb. 1989), pp. 155-178.
3. John M. Veitch, “Repudiations and Confiscations by the Medieval State” this JOURNAL, 46 (Mar. 1986), pp. 31-36.
4. W. Price, English Patents of Monopoly (Boston, 1906).
5. F. W. Maitland, Constitutional History of England (Cambridge, 1908).
6. Wallace Notestein, The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons (London, 1924).
7. H. J. Perkins, “The Social Causes of the British Industrial Revolution”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 18 (1968).
8. P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England (New York, 1967).
9. Maitland, Constitutional History, pp. 298-301.
10. Lord Macaulay, The History of England, (London, 1914), vol. V, p. 2438.