Can we rationally learn to coordinate?

Theory and Decision

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 29-49

  Goyal, Sanjeev ^a   Janssen, Maarten ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Collective rationality; Conventions; Coordination; Individual rationality; Learning

Indexed keywords

SOCIAL ASPECTS;

COORDINATION; LEARNING;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0030372667     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00133159     Document Type: Article

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