Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 2-25

  Blume, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030099048     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0022     Document Type: Article

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