An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 90, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 161-172

  Blume, Andreas ^a   Gneezy, Uri ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Coordination; learning; language; common knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347116135     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2573     Document Type: Article

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